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PERSPECTIVE 
The O.J. Inquisition: A United States 
Encounter With Continental Criminal 
Justice 
Myron Moskouitz* 
Editor's Note** 
October 3, 1995 marked the end of the O.J. Simpson double 
murder trial, which lasted 474 days and was billed "the trial of the 
century. " After less than four hours of deliberation, the jury 
acquitted Mr. Simpson of all charges. The following article is a 
dramatization of how a case similar to the Simpson trial might be 
handled by a civil-law European criminal justice system. 
Utilizing an unusual format, Professor Myron Moskovitz 
examines and illustrates the differences between the United States 
and civil-law European criminal justice systems. The author uses a 
play script inspired by the events in the trial of O.J. Simpson, set 
before a European Court. The script consists of fictitious 
conversations among a fictitious prosecutor, defense attorney, 
officers of a mock European Court, and two professors. The 
dialogue illustrates the differences between the two legal systems 
and the historical and sociological premises that inform them. 
* Professor of Law, Golden Gate University. The author would like to 
thank Professors Rudolph B. Schlesinger, MiIjan Damaska, Abraham S. 
Goldstein, Richard S. Frase, Craig M. Bradley, Lloyd L. Weinreb, Bernard Segal, 
Robert C. Calhoun and Joseph J. Darby for their helpful comments on an earlier 
draft of this article. 
** Due to the unusual format of Professor Moskovitz's academic 
commentary, the Journal has chosen not to apply its standard conventions in 
order to preserve the dramatic nature of the dialogue. 
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News Item? Due to pervasive public criticism of the United 
States "adversarial" criminal justice system, all parties have 
agreed to try the double murder trial in a neutral European 
nation, where the case will be handled under the "inquisitorial" 
legal system. When asked if it would be difficult to adjust to a 
new system in the short time remaining before trial, one of the 
attorneys replied, "No problem. There's probably a few minor 
differences between our systems, but we should be able to pick 
them up as we go along." 
Scene I: A courtroom in Europe. Ms. Clare and Professor 
Schmrz sit at the prosecution table. Mr. Crane and Professor 
Grbzyk sit at the defense table. At another table sit the victims' 
families and their attorney, Ms. Smith. Behind the tables, 
guarded by bailiffs, stands the Accused, and behind him is a 
gallery packed with spectators. All face a long, raised bench. 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
I must be nuts, letting you talk me into this. 
What now? They put my client on the rack and 
tum the screw 'til he talks? 
(laughing) That went out in the 18th century. 
You Americans have the wrong impression of 
the inquisitorial system. It's probably the most 
widely used legal system in the world today. It 
was started by the Catholic Church, and after 
the French Revolution, it was further developed 
by the French and the Germans. It then spread 
to the rest of Europe, except for the British 
Isles. Many Mrican, South American, and Asian 
countries have also adopted it. It's used much 
more today than your Anglo-American 
"adversarial" system. It's-
Can the lecture, Professor. Here they come. 
(whispering) Straighten your robe. 
Everyone stands. Nine people enter the courtroom from a 
side door. Three of them, wearing black robes, take the three 
center seats behind the bench. The other six wear red-and-white 
sashes, and they take the other seats. The man in the middle 
1. To the author's lmowledge, no person living or dead has engaged in 
any of the conversations that make up the dialogue of this perspective. 
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dons a red beret, then places a large book in front of him and 
opens it. 
Presiding Judge: The People of the State of California versus Mr. 
Clare: 
Crane: 
Smith: 
Clare: 
Smith: 
Clare: 
Sampson. Are counsel ready? 
Yes, your honor. 
(bowing) Ready, your majesty. 
Ready, your honor. 
Excuse me, your honor. I don't know who this 
person is. 
I'm Sally Smith, attorney for the families of the 
victims. 
What are you doing here? This is my case, a 
criminal case, not a civil case. You don't belong 
here. 
Presiding Judge: Ms. Clare, we allow the alleged victim to 
intervene and appear by counsel in our criminal 
trials. Who has a greater interest in seeing that 
justice is done than the victim? 
Clare: The State does, your honor. I represent the 
State, she doesn't. That's how it's done in the 
United States. 
Presiding Judge: But you haven't always done it that way. As I 
recall, in the early days of England and the 
United States, a criminal prosecution was 
usually brought by the victim, who also paid for 
it. Only recently, with the development of 
public prosecutors like yourself, has the status 
and the involvement of the victim withered 
away. 
Clare: Maybe it's coming back. Some states now allow 
victims to take part in sentencing hearings. 
Presiding Judge: In any event, we go further here, at least in 
trials of serious crimes. If the defendant is 
convicted, he might even be ordered to pay 
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Crane: 
damages to the victim. You, of course, do 
represent the State, but the victim may also 
appear by counsel. Now let's get to work. I will 
call as the fIrst witness -
Uh, excuse me, my lord. 
Presiding Judge: Yes, Mr. Crane? 
Crane: We seem to be forgetting something. 
Presiding Judge: Forgetting? 
Crane: Aren't we going to voir dire the jurors? You 
know, ask them a few questions to see if they're 
biased? Bounce a few out on peremptory 
challenges? That sort of thing. That comes 
fIrst, doesn't it? 
The Presiding Judge stares at Crane, then cracks up 
laughing. The whole courtroom joins in-except for Crane and 
Clare. 
Presiding Judge: Very good joke, Mr. Crane. We will now call the 
fIrst witness. Bailiffs, please bring the Accused 
forward. 
Crane: (sputtering) The Accused? That-this man is 
my client! The defendantl You can't make him 
testify-
Presiding Judge: (annoyed) Sit down, Mr. Crane. If you don't 
understand our procedure, perhaps Professor 
Grbzyk can enlighten you during a recess. Now, 
Mr. Sampson, let me ask you-
Clare: Excuse me, judge. 
Presiding Judge: Now what? Yes, Ms. Clare? 
Clare: I believe it's the prosecution's duty to present 
the state's case. So if you don't mind, I'll 
question the witness. 
Presiding Judge: (frowning, slamming down his gavel) We'll take a 
recess, so our U.S. friends may better acquaint 
themselves with continental procedure. 
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Scene IT: A small cafe next to the courthouse. Crane and 
Grbzyk sit at one table drinking coffee. Clare and Schrorz sit at 
another table. 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
What are these people, animals? They've never 
heard of due process? No wonder they're always 
going to war. (Sipping some espresso and 
making a face.) Bitter, bitter, bitter. 
Sugar? Relax, Mr. Crane. You Americans didn't 
invent civilization, you know. There's more than 
one way to run a justice system. 
You call this justice? I can't even voir dire my 
jurors. 
They're not jurors, at least not in the u.S. 
sense. 
Those six people without the robes. Judges or 
jurors? 
Jurors, sort of. They're called lay assessors. 
They're ordinary people, like your jurors, 
selected at random from the population. The 
parties have no right to question them or to 
remove any of them, so long as they meet our 
minimal qualifications of age, citizenship, and 
the like. You don't need to, really, because they 
can't decide the case by themselves anyway. 
What do you mean? 
The tribunal is a "mixed panel" of professional 
judges-the three people in the robes-and the 
lay assessors. The panel decides the case by a 
two-thirds majority. 
Now just a minute. You're not telling me that 
the judges go into a room with these lay 
assessors and deliberate with them? 
I'm afraid I am. You seem shocked. 
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Crane: Of course I'm shocked. What kind of a jury do 
you have when judges vote with the jurors? 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Well, the jurors-as you insist on calling 
them-can outvote the judges. There are six 
jurors and only three judges. 
Look, Professor, I wasn't born yesterday. Jurors 
think judges walk on water. When a 
judge-when three judges-tell the jurors what 
they think, what juror is going to disagree? 
I concede that it does not occur very often. 
Why not get rid of the jurors and be done with 
it? Be up front and let the judges decide the 
case. 
This does happen in minor cases. But in major 
cases, we want some lay involvement. Also, we 
have the lay people vote before the judges vote, 
so the lay people will not be influenced by the 
judges' votes. 
But they know what the judges think anyway 
because they heard the judges during the pre-
vote discussion. 
I suppose this is so. 
Where does the judge instruct these lay 
assessors on the law? In open court or behind 
closed doors, in the deliberation room? 
We have no formal jury instructions, as you do. 
During deliberations, the judge will explain the 
law to the assessors. I've seen your U.S. jury 
instructions. They are usually in the language 
of statutes or appellate court opinions. They 
may be legally correct, but they're very difficult 
for lay people to understand. Your judges are 
reluctant to depart from them by even a single 
word, for fear of reversal on appeal. In our 
system, the judge explains the law to the 
assessors in simple language. If they have 
trouble getting it, the judge may discuss it with 
1995J 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
THE O.J. INQUISITION 1127 
them informally until they understand. This all 
happens in the deliberation room. 
Makes sense, I guess. I've often wondered how 
much U.S. jurors really understand when the 
judge reads them those long, legalistic 
instructions. But in your system, the lawyers 
have no idea what the judge is telling the jurors. 
Suppose he makes a mistake? How would I ever 
know about it? 
After the tribunal decides the case, one of the 
judges will write the judgment. It is not a 
simple "guilty" or "not guilty" verdict, as you 
have. It will spell out what law the tribunal 
applied, in detail. 
But that's written after the tribunal already 
voted. Maybe the judge told the jurors 
something different from what he wrote in the 
judgment. 
No European judge would do a thing like that, 
Mr. Crane. 
You sure seem to trust these guys. 
I suppose we do. It's good to get an outsider's 
perspective on one's legal system, Mr. Crane. 
Perhaps we can learn a lot from each other. 
**** 
I can't believe this. I schlepped all the way to 
Europe, and I can't even question a witness? 
Madame must have patience. Your tum will 
come. 
Oh yeah? When? After the verdict? It's my 
case to try, isn't' it? 
Not exactly. Do you understand why our 
system is called "inquisitorial?" 
After the Spanish Inquisition? 
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Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
No, Madame. We have become a bit more 
civilized since then. It is inquisitorial because it 
is based on the tribunal's duty to inquire, to 
fmd the truth. In your adversarial system, the 
parties are responsible for presenting the 
evidence, pretty much in any way they see fit. 
The judge merely makes sure that everyone 
behaves, and the jury sits passively and listens. 
When the lawyers are done, the jury decides. 
Neither the jury nor the judge takes any active 
part in investigating the case, seeking out 
evidence, or otherwise fmding out what 
happened. This is not so in the inquisitorial 
system. Here, our judges are responsible for 
fmding the truth themselves. 
Do they do that in civil cases too? 
No. Our method of litigating civil disputes is 
different from yours, but it is built on the same 
basic premise: the state has very little stake in 
the outcome of civil litigation. In both Europe 
and the United States, the state provides a 
proper forum for the resolution of private 
disputes, but it cares little about who wins a 
particular case. True, the state establishes 
substantive rules of law, in order to cause 
certain results in society, and these rules are 
enforced partly through private litigation. But 
in a particular case, the state provides the 
playing field and the umpire, that's all. For 
example, if the parties choose to settle in the 
middle of a case-even on that which might 
seem unjust to an outsider-the judge will 
seldom hesitate to terminate the litigation. If 
the parties are satisfied, the state has no further 
interest in the matter. This is so in both of our 
systems. What seems odd to us, however, is 
that in the United States you treat criminal 
cases pretty much the same way, even though 
the state clearly has an interest in seeing that 
the guilty are convicted and the innocent are 
freed. In Europe, we operate openly on this 
principle. This is why the state inquires: the 
state itself cares about the outcome. 
1995J 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
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So that's why the presiding judge does the 
questioning? 
Yes. When he is done, you and Mr. Crane will 
have a chance to ask additional questions. 
If there's anything left to ask about. 
I grant that this is unlikely, if the presiding 
judge is thorough. 
This is ridiculous. Why am I even in the 
courtroom? I might as well read a book or take 
a nap. 
Our prosecutors have been known to do both, 
on occasion. 
Look, Professor, you don't seem to realize what's 
at stake for me here. This is my case. If I lose, 
I'm back in Compton Muni Court prosecuting 
parking tickets. 
Lose? I don't understand. 
What's to understand? Lose. You know, like 
the Super Bowl or the World Series. If you win, 
I lose. 
Ah, I see. The adversarial system is ·speaking. 
But in our system, prosecutors never lose. 
Never lose? So the game is flXed? 
No. There is no "game." Prosecutors never lose, 
but they never win, either. They simply don't 
think in terms of winning or losing. If the 
tribunal acquits the defendant, the prosecutor 
feels no sense of having lost the case. He has 
done his job, and the tribunal has done its job. 
His responsibility is to assist the tribunal in 
fmding a just result, not to "win." 
How "un-American." 
Quite so, I'm afraid. 
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Clare: But what about the prosecutor's career? 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Doesn't he move up the ladder by winning his 
cases? 
Our prosecutor is a civil servant, not a political 
figure. He advances by faithfully performing his 
duties. Whether the tribunal convicts or acquits 
the defendant is of no consequence. 
It's certainly of consequence where I come from. 
My community fears crime, and they want 
convictions. If I don't get 'em, I'm out. 
You are employed by your community, is that 
correct? 
Sure. The county board of supervisors pays my 
salary. 
So naturally you must please them. But our 
prosecutors do not work for local governments. 
All are employed by our central government in 
the capital. They are not unduly concerned 
with the . ephemeral reactions of the 
communities in which they happen to be based. 
When a prosecutor is promoted, she will 
probably be transferred to another city anyway. 
That certainly would affect how they see their 
cases. 
Madame, you should stop thinking of "my case" 
and "their cases." The case belongs to the 
tribunal, not to the lawyers . 
. Very lofty, Professor, but let's get down to 
practicalities. I question witnesses because I 
know the case, backwards and forwards. I 
investigated the case and I prepared for trial, so 
I know what to ask and how to follow up 
answers with more questions. The judge can't 
do that, because he comes into court cold. He 
doesn't know the case. 
This judge does. 
1995J 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
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How? 
Did you notice the large book the presiding 
judge has been looking at? 
Yes. I thought it was a law book. 
Not quite. It is called a dossier. It contains the 
report of the examining magistrate. 
Who's she? 
The examining magistrate is another judge, who 
investigates the case before trial, after the police 
have completed their investigation. She 
interviews all witnesses and writes reports on 
what they said. She also sees that physical 
evidence is gathered and any needed scientific 
tests are performed. She then compiles all of 
these documents into the dossier, which she 
gives to the judge who will preside at the trial. 
This is the French system. Some countries, like 
Germany, have eliminated the examining 
magistrate, and the prosecutor prepares the 
dossier. 
Hold on. You mean to tell me that before the 
trial even begins, the judges and jurors have 
read a whole report on the case? 
Not all of them. Just the presiding judge and 
perhaps one other judge, who might be 
responsible for writing the judgment. The 
presiding judge needs the dossier in order to 
perform his job of questioning witnesses. 
But he votes, and he can influence the others 
during deliberations. In the U.S. of A. we would 
never tolerate a judge or juror who had read a 
whole detailed report on the case before the trial 
even began. I'm no bleeding heart liberal, mind 
you, but even a slimeball criminal defendant is 
entitled to a fact-fmder who hasn't already made 
up his mind. 
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Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Perhaps we trust our judges more than you 
trust yours. 
It's not just a matter of trust. It's a matter of 
the limits of the human mind. While your 
presiding judge is questioning the witnesses, he 
is also supposed to be making up his mind on 
how to vote. How can anyone do both at the 
same time? Sure, he can throw out easy, 
softball questions to witnesses. But sometimes 
the best way to get to the truth is through 
tough, hardball cross-examination. That's often 
the best way to deal with a liar. How can a 
judge do that and still be a neutral fact-fmder? 
I couldn't do it, and I don't think you could 
either. That's why it's better to have people like 
me and Crane cross-examine. We can be as 
tough or tricky as we want, and it doesn't 
matter, because we don't decide the case. 
I see your point. Of course, keep in mind that 
we do allow the attorneys to question a witness 
when the presiding judge is done. 
So they do the cross-examining? 
Not in the way you describe. The presiding 
judge usually does such a complete job that 
there is little left to ask, and the attorneys don't 
want to offend the judge by implying that he 
was less than thorough. So at most, they might 
ask a question or two, usually very politely. 
Most of them have had little or no experience 
with U.S.-style cross-examination. 
That must make it pretty easy for someone to lie 
in your courts-and get away with it. 
The presiding judge is a very stern and 
prestigious figure. One would not lightly lie to 
him. And if the tribunal believes that the 
defendant has lied, that might well affect the 
sentence it imposes on the defendant. 
In the United States, it's probably a little easier 
for a defendant to concoct a lie that sounds 
plausible, because he doesn't testify until after 
1995J 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
SChmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Crane: 
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he's heard the prosecution case. Here, he can't 
do that, because he goes ftrst. 
He does go ftrst, but he is nevertheless familiar 
with the prosecution case before he testiftes. 
Before trial, we allow the defendant to see the 
complete dossier, which contains summaries of 
the testimony of each witness. Howeverf those 
summaries might not be as detailed as the in-
court testimony of witnesses, still yet to come. 
So our defendants might be taking a chance by 
inventing or embellishing stories. 
You let him see the whole dossier? 
We do. Both the prosecutor and the defense 
counsel may examine the dossier before trial. 
We believe in complete pre-trial discovery. 
There are no secrets. 
Discovery is much more limited in the United 
States. We don't want to give the defendant a 
chance to adapt his story to what the 
prosecution witnesses are going to say, and we 
don't want him to intimidate or bribe 
prosecution witnesses. 
But here the defendant has probably already 
told his story to the examining magistrate, as 
have the prosecution witnesses. They are not 
likely to change their stories much at trial, and 
if they do not appear, their written statements 
may be considered anyway. 
Even though they're hearsay? 
Hearsay? What is that? 
Oh, boy. Toto, we're not in Kansas anymore. 
**** 
OK, Professor, I'm beginning to get a glimmer of 
how your system works, though I can't say I like 
it-yet. But how can they call the Accused as 
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Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
the ftrst witness? Don't you have any privilege 
againstseli-tncrantnationhere? 
In a way. After your client answers some 
general questions about his background, the 
presidtng judge will advise him that he has the 
right not to answer questions about the crane 
itseli. But defendants rarely assert that right. 
Why not? I've had a lot of clients I'd never put 
on the stand. Why open them up to cross-
examination and have their stories ripped 
apart? 
Remember, the presiding judge has read the 
dossier. He knows there is evidence that the 
defendant committed the crane, and he wants 
the defendant's response. 
So he's presumed guilty, before the trial even 
starts? 
No. In former times, a conviction could be 
based on the dossier alone. Today, however, the 
tribunal may not convict the defendant unless 
the evidence produced at the trial ftrmly 
convtnces the tribunal that the defendant is 
guilty. But let's be practical. The person who 
prepared the dossier-the examtning magistrate 
or the prosecutor-is an experienced, unbiased 
government official. If she has determined that 
there is sufficient evidence to go forward with 
the trial, everyone knows there is a good chance 
the defendant is guilty. In the United States, 
you like to pretend otherwise, but that's just 
pretense, isn't it? 
Well, maybe it is. I've always wondered if jurors 
really follow the judge's tnstruction to give no 
weight to the fact that the police have arrested 
the defendant and the prosecutor has brought 
the case to trial. I guess it's what you might call 
a "useful ftction." 
We believe tn honesty. 
1995J 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
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Hmm. Before you get too cocky, Professor, 
answer this, if you will. Suppose I tell my client 
just to clam up when the judge questions him 
about the crime? 
If the defendant fails to respond, the judge will 
assume the worst. And the defendant knows it. 
But that's using the defendant's silence against 
him. We don't allow that, at least not openly. 
We do. Who knows more about the crime than 
the defendant, and what -good is served by his 
silence? In any event, there's another reason 
for him to talk. 
Which is? 
In your system, the trial is about guilt, and only 
about guilt. Sentencing comes later. We don't 
do it that way. Our trials are about both guilt 
and sentencing. If the tribunal fmds the 
defendant guilty, the judgment will also contain 
the sentence. So the presiding judge must 
develop evidence not only about whether the 
defendant committed the crime, but also about 
what sentence he deserves if he did it. 
You're kidding! You mean that evidence about 
his prior record, his whole life-everything we 
consider in sentencin~omes in at his triar? 
Quite correct. Does that bother you? 
Bother me? No, it kills me. How can you give a 
guy a fair trial on whether he committed this 
crime when you know that he has four priors, 
went AWOL from the Army, and stole two bits 
from the church collection box when he was a 
kid? In the United States, we call this stuff 
irrelevant and prejudicial and keep it out of the 
trial. 
I suppose we trust our tribunal more than you 
trust yours. With our judges deliberating along 
with the lay assessors, the judges will make 
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Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
sure that the assessors do not draw any 
improper inferences. 
Yeah, I bet. Anyway, I see your point. At a U.S. 
sentencing hearing, it is better for the defendant 
to talk. He's already been found guilty, and if 
he won't cooperate now, the judge is likely to 
throw the book at him. If you guys combine 
guilt and sentencing into one trial, I have only 
one shot at showing the tribunal that the 
defendant isn't such a bad guy, so I'd better tell 
him to answer the judge's questions. 
You're learning fast, Mr. Crane. 
I guess there's another reason to have him 
testify, or maybe a reason not to have him not 
testify. In the United States, if I allow my client 
to testify, the D.A. can then introduce his prior 
felony convictions to show that he's not a very 
credible witness. The judge will tell the jury not 
to think he's committed this crime just because 
he committed the priors, but I don't think most 
jurors can draw such fme lines. So lots of times 
I don't put him on the stand just because I don't 
want the jury to hear about the priors. Over 
here, the tribunal will hear about the priors 
anyway, whether he testifies or not. So I might 
as well put him on. 
Very astute. I hadn't thought of that. 
Still, it doesn't seem fair to put a defendant in a 
position where he has to hang himself by 
talking. And if they think he's lying, they can 
try to nail him for peIjury. 
That cannot happen. 
You don't prosecute people for lying under oath? 
We do. But the accused is never put under 
oath. We want his testimony, but we feel that 
the threat of peIjury would unfairly put too 
much pressure on him. 
1995J 
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Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
2. 
(1966). 
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(shaking his head) Weird. You people are really 
weird. 
Perhaps when you see how all the pieces fit 
together, we will seem less weird. 
What about be/ore the trial? Can the police or 
the examining magistrate question the 
defendant, get a confession out of him, and then 
use it at the trial? 
Generally, yes. But whenever a suspect is to be 
questioned, he must first be advised of his right 
to silence and his right to counsel. 
Sounds familiar. 
It should. Some countries have explicitly based 
these requirements on your Miranda2 decision. 
Interesting. I've seen a few U.S. decisions cite 
European practices as authority for some new 
idea, but it's pretty rare. 
It should be rare. It's a dangerous thing to do. 
One shouldn't graft a feature from a different 
system until one fully comprehends how the 
entire system supports that feature. 
I'm not sure I get what you're saying. 
You will, as you learn more about our system. 
So, do your defendants exercise their Miranda 
rights, or do they waive them? 
Before the police, they often waive them, as do 
your defendants. But when the examining 
magistrate questions a defendant, usually she 
will not allow a waiver of the right to counsel. 
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 15 L. Ed. 2d 694 
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Crane: So once the guy gets a lawyer, the lawyer tells 
him not to answer the examining magistrate's 
questions, right? 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Quite the contrary. The lawyer almost always 
advises him to answer. 
Even though his answers might be used against 
him in the dossier? 
Yes. Don't forget, if he refuses to answer, he 
will be faced with the same questions at trial, 
and-as we discussed earlier-he will pretty 
much have to answer them then. 
So he might as well look cooperative from the 
get-go, to minimize his sentence. 
Correct. And if he confesses before trial, there 
is not much point in refusing to confess again at 
the trial. 
Each aspect of this thing seems to support the 
other. 
Quite so. And there is another reason for him 
to answer the examining magistrate's questions. 
The magistrate also has the power to decide 
whether the defendant is detained or released 
pending trial. 
So if he wants to stay out of the pokey, he'd 
better be nice. 
You Americans are very practical, Mr. Crane. 
So are you Europeans. Your whole system 
seems designed to get a confession as soon as 
possible, even though you go through the 
motions of telling the guy he doesn't have to 
answer. 
He does have the right not to answer. But we 
see no point in encouraging him to exercise that 
right, the way you Americans do. Our goal is to 
fmd the truth, and the defendant is in a very 
good position to help us accomplish that task. 
1995J 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
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What is wrong with asking him to tell us what 
he knows? 
We've had some bad experiences with that, 
going back to the Star Chamber in England and 
"third degree" interrogations in the United 
States, with the police beating and threatening 
people if they won't talk. 
So have we. Don't forget the Spanish 
Inquisition, and we did allow torture until the 
19th century. But that is all behind us now, 
and torture and threats are illegal. So long as 
they are, why shouldn't we simply ask the 
defendant to tell what happened? 
It's just not right for the government to intrude 
into someone's mind, into his private thoughts. 
But you intrude into private thoughts quite 
frequently, don't you? Any non-defendant 
witness may be compelled to testify about his 
thoughts, so long as they are relevant and no 
recognized privilege applies. In this very case, 
police officers were compelled to testify about 
what they thought about many things, including 
probable cause to search and their beliefs about 
race and interracial marriage. 
True, but a defendant in a criminal case is 
different. The government has many more 
resources than the defendant. They should 
have to prove the case without using him to 
help them. 
So in the adversary system, you handicap the 
prosecution in order to make the game fair, even 
if this detracts from finding the truth? 
Look, the prosecution has plenty of ways to 
prove the truth. They have investigators, crime 
labs, the FBI, and the whole government 
apparatus when they need it. In the usual case, 
the defense has just one lawyer and, if you're 
lucky, maybe an investigator or two. 
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Grbzyk: 
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Grbzyk: 
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Yes, but in a given case, all the government's 
resources might be insufficient. In this case, for 
example, the prosecution must prove its case by 
inference, with blood samples, DNA tests, and 
evidence of motivation and opportunity. But 
only one person who is still alive saw exactly 
what happened and knows exactly what his 
mental state was when (and if) he did it. That's 
the defendant himself. Why not allow the court 
to ask him? 
Maybe it comes down to this. We don't think 
it's right to make people incriminate themselves 
with their own words. 
Strange. When European parents fmd cookies 
missing from the cookie jar and ask their child 
what happened, they do not expect the child to 
answer, "It's not right to ask me to incriminate 
myself." Are u.S. parents different? 
Of course not, but criminal defendants aren't 
kids. A kid who steals cookies might be sent to 
his room for an hour, but a criminal defendant 
will be sent to a very small cell for a very long 
time, and maybe to the gas chamber. The 
parents are trying to help the kid learn how to 
behave. The government is not trying to help 
the defendant in any way, shape, or form. It's 
not the same. 
You seem to dislike our reliance on confessions, 
Mr. Crane. But u.S. attorneys advise most of 
their clients to confess, don't they? 
We do? 
Yes. Isn't that what you do during your plea 
bargaining? You advise your client to plead 
guilty, in order to obtain the benefits of the 
bargain. Isn't that pretty much a confession? 
I hadn't thought of it like that. 
So perhaps your system relies on confessions 
just as much as ours does. 
1995J 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
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Interesting. Even though our systems look 
really different on the surface, maybe there are 
similarities, once you look a little deeper. 
Possibly. But it is risky to assume that "we are 
all the same, at bottom." There might in fact be 
some real differences. And now we must return 
to court. 
They rise and begin walking, as do Clare and Schmrz. 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Is the inquisitorial system the same throughout 
Europe, Professor? 
Yes and no. There are fundamental features 
that do not vary much. Judges, not the parties, 
are responsible for developing the evidence. The 
judge receives a dossier before the trial begins. 
There are other common features I will explain 
when we have more time. There are variations, 
however. In smaller cases, what you call 
misdemeanors, the tribunal might consist of 
only one judge and two lay assessors. Some 
countries use tribunals where judges 
outnumber lay assessors. Germany, for 
example, uses three judges and two lay 
assessors in cases of serious crime. And some 
countries use no lay assessors at all except in 
major cases. The procedure you will see in this 
case is somewhat typical, but other countries 
might differ a bit. Italy has a sort of hybrid 
system. 
Our adversary system also varies somewhat 
from state to state. I guess it's the same here. 
Exactly. A very good analogy. 
Scene m: The Courtroom 
Presiding Judge: Thank you for your testimony, Mr. Sampson. 
We appreciate your candor. A truly amazing 
story. Oh, excuse me. Does counsel have any 
further questions for the accused? 
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Clare: I guess not, your honor. You seem to have 
asked everything I was going to ask. 
Crane: Your astute questioning would put most U.S. 
lawyers to shame. No questions, your grace. 
Presiding Judge: Why thank you, Mr. Crane. How very kind. 
**** 
Presiding Judge: Detective Farmer, please tell us what happened 
when you went to the home of the accused. 
Farmer: 
Crane: 
I went there to tell him his ex-wife had been 
killed. But his gate was closed, and no one 
answered the intercom. So I climbed over the 
gate. I found this glove on the driveway. (He 
displays a glove.) It matches a glove we found 
at the murder scene. 
Objection, your honor. That glove was obtained 
in violation of the Fourth Amendment. 
Presiding Judge: The what, Mr. Crane? 
Crane: Sorry, Judge. Wrong country. We contend that 
Detective Farmer conducted an illegal search by 
hopping the gate without a warrant. 
Presiding Judge: So? 
Crane: So? So the glove can't be 1;lsed in evidence. 
Presiding Judge: Why not? It is relevant evidence, is it not? 
Crane: That doesn't matter. If it was obtained by an 
illegal search, it goes out. Everyone knows that. 
Presiding Judge: Not everyone in Europe knows that, Mr. Crane. 
We assume that the tribunal should consider all 
relevant evidence. We do not employ the 
exclusionary rule, as you call it in the United 
States, except in extreme cases. 
Crane: Then how do you make your police behave? 
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Presiding Judge: All of our police work for the Ministry of Justice, 
which is part of our central government. When 
the Minister issues an order, every policeman in 
the country must obey it, or suffer demotion or 
termination of employment. In the United 
States, this cannot happen. You have many 
hundreds of independent cities, counties, and 
states, each running its own police department. 
The only institution you have for setting 
minimum standards of behavior for all 
policemen is your Supreme Court. And the only 
tool your Supreme Court has for enforcing those 
standards is to order that illegally-obtained 
evidence be excluded. 
Crane: True, your honor, but even here in Europe, with 
a more transient population and an increase in 
crime, your cops will tend to feel the pressure to 
harass certain people. And the cops' bosses will 
tend to look the other way. That's why courts 
need to keep out illegally-seized evidence in 
order to deter the police from doing that kind of 
stuff. 
Presiding Judge: The circumstances you describe have not 
afflicted Europe as much as the United States. 
Crane: Times change, Judge. 
Presiding Judge: You're quite right, Mr. Crane. Times do change. 
Some European countries have begun to 
experience more police abuses, and some have 
begun to apply an exclusionary rule to evidence 
obtained by certain acts, such as illegal 
wiretapping. As yet, none has gone so far as the 
United States. In our tradition, the goal of a 
criminal trial is to f'md the truth, not to serve 
other ends. But who knows what the future will 
hold? 
**** 
Presiding Judge: Detective Farmer, what did Mr. Crawford tell 
you about the activities of the accused that 
night? 
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Crane: Objection, your honor. That calls for hearsay. 
Presiding Judge: Hearsay, counsel? We do not recognize such an 
objection. 
Crane: What? I thought the point of an inquisitorial 
trial is to fmd the truth. In the United States, 
the key to making sure that witnesses tell the 
truth is cross-examination. Detective Farmer is 
here in court, so I can cross-examine him as to 
what he says he heard from Mr. Crawford. But 
Crawford isn't here, so if he was mistaken or 
lying about what he told the detective, I can't 
bring that out by cross-examining him. That's 
why we exclude hearsay, your honor, and you 
should too. 
Presiding Judge: You give good reasons for according less weight 
to hearsay, Mr. Crane, but why exclude it 
entirely? Isn't it worth something? It might 
help us to see the entire picture, and what's the 
harm in letting Mr. Farmer tell us what he 
heard? 
Crane: Jurors aren't well-trained and experienced 
enough to make the fme distinctions that you 
are making. They might not see the difference 
between hearsay and what the detective saw 
himself. They might give too much weight to 
the hearsay. 
Presiding Judge: But I will be there to help them make these 
distinctions. Don't forget: in our system, the 
judges and the lay assessors deliberate together. 
Crane: So you have no rules of evidence? Everything 
comes in? 
Presiding Judge: Not everything. Evidence must still be relevant 
to the case, and we do recognize certain 
privileges, as you do. A doctor may not testify 
as to what his patient told him, nor may a 
lawyer tell what his client told him. We want to 
encourage patients and clients to speak freely to 
professionals. But your stricter rules of 
evidence are built on the premise that untrained 
lay people, your jurors, might easily become 
1995J 
Crane: 
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confused or distracted if you did not limit what 
they could hear. We have no such problem, for 
we do not treat our lay assessors as a separate 
body. 
I think I'm starting to catch on to something. I 
can't just compare a feature of our system with 
a similar feature of your system. Each part is 
affected by other parts. I really have to consider 
the system as a whole. 
Presiding Judge: Quite so, Mr. Crane. People often look at an 
isolated aspect of a system, fmd it attractive, 
and assume that it may be transferred intact to 
another system. This is a mistake. Both the 
adversarial and the inquisitorial systems are 
integrated systems. Each piece is affected and 
supported by every other piece. Transfer a piece 
without its support system, and it will probably 
fail or distort some other features that you 
didn't intend to affect. 
**** 
Presiding Judge: Ms. Bruin, did you ever see the Accused strike 
his ex-wife? 
Crane: 
Clare: 
Objection, your honor. Evidence of prior crimes 
or bad acts should be inadmissible to show that 
the defendant has a bad character. 
But it is admissible to show that he had a 
motive to kill, or a pattern of behavior that is 
consistent with the method of killing. That's 
what this evidence shows, your honor. 
Presiding Judge: An interesting dispute. I would expect you to 
make these arguments at the end of the trial, 
when you try to persuade the tribunal how 
much weight we should give to any evidence 
that he struck her. But why are you arguing 
this now? 
Crane: If I'm right, then the evidence is inadmissible. 
You and your fellow judges and jurors shouldn't 
even be hearing it. It's too prejudicial. Once 
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you hear it, you might not be able to put it out 
of your minds. 
Presiding Judge: Mr. Crane, in U.S. bench trials, your judges 
often hear evidence, rule it inadmissible, and 
then go on to decide the case. You trust them to 
disregard such evidence. Why don't you trust 
me? 
Crane: Of course I trust you, your honor, but I'm not so 
sure about these lay jurors. They don't have 
your training and experience. They might 
convict just because this evidence shows that 
the defendant is a bad guy, not because he 
committed the killings. 
Presiding Judge: Recall the response I made to your hearsay 
objection. I will be in the deliberation room to 
advise the lay assessors how to perform their 
jobs, and to prevent them from acting 
improperly. Your U.S. jurors are not so well 
monitored as ours. Objection overruled. 
**** 
Presiding Judge: Doctor, please tell us the results of your DNA 
testing on the hair samples. 
Crane: Objection, your honor. We haven't heard any 
convincing evidence that DNA testing is 
scientifically valid. 
Presiding Judge: Such evidence would be helpful, to be sure, but 
I am not aware of any statute that prevents us 
from hearing the doctor's testimony. 
Crane: There's no statute, your honor, but I've got a 
case. In People v. Glump, the court held that a 
defendant was denied a fair trial when a 
technician testified about a breathalyzer test 
without evidence that the device they used was 
scientifically valid. 
Presiding Judge: So? 
1995J THE O.J. INQUISITION 1147 
Crane: So that case is precedent for my position, your 
honor. Glump seems to stand for the larger 
principle that-
Presiding Judge: Counsel, I do not care about Glump. We do not 
treat precedent as you do in the United States. 
In your common-law system, the law evolves 
through the application of the law to specific 
facts, so your published decisions are very 
important in determining what the law is. But 
in our system, the law is fIXed by the 
Legislature, and it is changed by the 
Legislature, not by th~ ,90urts. Evolution 
depends on changing values. and we leave the 
examination of values to our legislative bodies. 
So we have little need for case precedent. 
Crane: All right, judge, here's my trump card: Glump 
was decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. Now 
will you pay a little more attention to it? 
Presiding Judge: Not much, at least in the way you want me to 
use it. If I am unsure as to the meaning of 
certain terms used in a statute, I might fmd 
guidance in a reported decision, especially from 
such a prestigious body as the Supreme Court. 
But the facts of the case-breathalyzers, DNA, 
whatever-mean little or nothing to me. If you 
can show me something in this Glump decision 
that explains the meaning of a statute that 
applies to our case, I'll be happy to look at it, 
Mr. Crane. 
Crane: Sony, your honor, Glump doesn't do that. 
Scene IV: On the Courthouse steps 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
I needed this break. My head is still spinning. 
The adjustment must be difficult for you. 
I guess I can handle it. If I can handle Crane, I 
can do any ... Speak of the devil. 
Crane and Grbzyk approach. 
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Crane: How you doin', Ms. D.A.? 
Clare: Not bad, Counselor. Just ruminating over the 
peculiarities of this inquisitorial system. Do you 
understand it? 
Crane: Perfectly. No problem at all. I'm a quick study. 
Clare: Yeah, sure. 
Crane: Now that you mention it, I might be a little 
shaky on a couple of nuances. I have to admit 
I'm having trouble predicting how this case is 
going to come out. It's hard enough to make 
predictions in our own courts. Here, with all 
these foreigners-well, it worries me. 
Clare: I was thinking the same thing. 
Crane: I don't want my client convicted of two fIrst 
degree murders. 
Clare: And I don't want to go back to Los Angeles with 
nothing but an acquittal to show for it. 
They eye each other. 
Crane and Clare: (together) Let's dealt 
They huddle. 
Clare: 
Crane: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Crane: 
Schmrz: 
Plead him guilty to just one first degree charge, 
and I'll drop the second charge. 
Are you kidding? He'd still get life. 
of involuntary manslaughter. 
absolute top offer. 
Very funny. How about-
One charge 
That's my 
Excuse me. What are you two doing? 
We're plea bargaining. 
Plea bargaining? 
1995J 
Clare: 
Crane: 
Schmrz: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Clare: 
Crane: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
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Yes. We do a little horse-trading, and maybe we 
can come to an agreement. I drop or reduce 
some charges, and perhaps agree to recommend 
a certain sentence. In return, he agrees to 
plead guilty. 
If, of course, my client agrees. 
In the United States, you bargain over justice 
like farmers bargain over horses? You consider 
this dignified? 
Is it less dignified than. pushing a guy to 
confess, Professor? 
At least our practice leads to the truth and a 
just result. Plea bargaining does just the 
opposite. According to the evidence we heard, 
your client is either guilty of two murders or 
guilty of no crime at all. How can you even 
consider a single manslaughter charge? 
But that's what bargaining is all about. Each 
side gives up something. I want two murders, 
and he wants no crime at all. So we cut a deal. 
And there's something you're overlooking. As I 
understand it, your sentences are pretty 
reasonable compared to ours. You mostly use 
fmes, and when you do incarcerate people, it's 
usually for short terms. In the United States, 
our potential sentences are extremely high, and 
sometimes the legislature fixes the punishment 
and gives the judge no discretion to lower it for 
a particular defendant who doesn't deserve that 
much. So plea bargaining is our way of 
reaching a just result. 
Why are your sentences so low? Don't you want 
to stop crime? 
Of course we do. But we do it by curing the 
offender of his deviant ways and reintegrating 
him into society as soon as possible. The state 
assumes a parental role with the offender. By 
contrast, your system seems to be adversarial in 
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Clare: 
Grbzyk: 
Clare: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Clare: 
more ways than one. Not only is the prosecutor 
the adversaxy of the defendant, so is the state 
itself. We prefer to see offenders as potentially 
decent citizens who have temporarily gone 
astray. 
We used to see them that way, but at some 
point we gave up. These days, heavy criminals 
are treated as permanent outcasts. We don't 
see "reintegration" as a realistic possibility, so 
we pretty much lock 'em up and throwaway the 
key. 
Do 'you think this is an effective way to reduce 
crime? 
Sure. If they're 
crimes-at least 
community. 
in jail, they can't commit 
not on the law-abiding 
But they will eventually get out. When they are 
released, do their punishments make them less 
likely to commit more crimes? 
No way. They'll be more likely to commit new 
crimes. We don't spend much effort trying to 
teach prisoners to adjust to society and earn 
their way honestly, so they just learn more 
about being criminals. And sentences being as 
long as they are, often these guys are pretty 
angry when they get out. We treat them as 
outcasts, so that's what they become. 
It seems odd. You punish your defendants more 
severely than we do, in order to reduce crime, 
and yet your crime rates are much higher than 
ours. What conclusions may we draw from 
this? 
It's pretty obvious, isn't it? Harsh punishments 
don't work. 
That's ridiculous. You could just as logically 
conclude that because of our high crime rates, 
we need harsher punishments to prevent them 
from going even higher. 
1995J 
Schmrz: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Clare: 
Grbzyk: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
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One cannot infer causation just from 
correlation. High crime rates and high 
punishments often go together, but we cannot 
be sure whether either one has any causal 
impact on the other. 
Mr. Crane, earlier you seemed troubled by our 
quest for confessions. But a confession is an 
important step on the road to rehabilitation. 
Until the offender admits he did wrong, how can 
he change his ways? A good confession 
cleanses the soul. 
So because we don't· plan to do much to 
rehabilitate him, it doesn't matter much 
whether he confesses? 
That's a bit of an overstatement. When a judge 
has discretion in sentencing, he will tend to go 
easier on a defendant who admits his crime. 
And the same is true of parole boards. So we do 
get a lot of confessions, at least after trial. 
Here in Europe, of course, the trial is about 
both guilt and sentencing, so he can't very well 
hold off confessing 'til after the trial. So it is 
important that he confess at trial. 
I'd like to return to this plea bargaining for a 
moment. Once the lawyers arrive at a bargain, 
is that fmal? Does the judge have no say in 
whether the bargain does justice to the state 
and to the victim? 
Well, the judge can reject the deal. But he's 
usually happy to accept it. It saves the court 
the expense and trouble of a trial. 
But by reducing the charges you, the 
prosecutor, have effectively reduced the 
sentence. Is this proper? Are you trained in the 
sociological and psychological aspects of 
sentencing? 
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Clare: Not really, but neither are our judges. My guess 
is probably as good as theirs. And if they think 
I'm really off the mark, they can reject the deal. 
Schmrz: 
Grbzyk: 
Clare: 
Grbzyk: 
Clare: 
Scbmrz: 
Clare: 
In Europe, the prosecutor may recommend a 
certain sentence, but she does not make the 
fmal determination, even partially. That is for 
the court, not the prosecutor. 
This plea bargaining is legal'in your counby? 
Legal? It's essential I In most places, less than 
twenty percent of our cases go to trial. The rest 
are plea bargained. If they weren't, we'd be up 
to our eyeballs in trials. We'd probably need five 
times more prosecutors, judges, jurors, 
courtrooms, bailiffs, and all the rest. Since 
every defendant has the right to a speedy trial, 
I'd have to dismiss a lot of cases if I couldn't 
plea bargain. 
I don't understand. If people in the United 
States really believe that the adversary trial is 
the best way to achieve justice, shOUldn't they 
be more than willing to pay whatever it takes to 
by every case? 
Tough question. I guess they're not that 
committed to the adversary trial. They may like 
the general idea of it, but when it comes to 
paying for it, they'd rather pay for more cops or 
more prisons, where they can see some effects 
on crime. 
U.S. citizens are such a peculiar lot. Because 
they like the general idea of the adversary trial, 
they have made it so elaborate that they can 
afford to give it to only one out of every five 
defendantsl Strange, very strange. Wouldn't it 
be better to make the trial less complex, so that 
more defendants could have a trial? That might 
make plea bargaining unnecessary. 
I never quite looked at it that way. In any event, 
the way things are right now, we can't live 
without plea bargaining. 
1995] 
Schmrz: 
Crane: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Grbzyk: 
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And we can't live with it. Here it is illegal. 
Illegal? Why? If the parties agree to settle their 
case, why should that bother the court? 
Because the case belongs to the court, not to 
the parties. The tribunal may not convict or 
sentence the defendant unless it fIrst hears the 
evidence, and if the evidence shows that the 
defendant committed a certain crime, the 
tribunal may not reduce the crime just because 
the prosecutor agrees to it. 
So every case goes to trial? . 
Every case, Madame. At least every major case. 
But not if the defendant pleads guilty. 
There is no such thing as a guilty plea in our 
system. That would be permitting the parties 
rather than the court to determine the truth, 
which is not permissible. Every case goes to 
trial. At the trial, the defendant might well 
admit that the charges are true, and many do 
so. But the tribunal must nevertheless hear 
evidence, in order to determine the sentence. 
That must put a terrible burden on your courts. 
Trials can take weeks, even months in a murder 
case. It can take weeks just to pick ajury. 
You forget. Our "jurors" are picked without the 
lengthy voir dire and peremptory challenges that 
take so much time in your courts. Most of our 
trials do not take very long. Because the 
presiding judge questions the witnesses, we do 
not take up much time with lawyers' cross-
examination and the like. We do not allow 
many objections to evidence, which may save us 
more time. We have no need for the lengthy 
pre-trial hearings on the admissibility of 
evidence that you have. And the defendant 
often confesses at trial, because he confessed 
earlier. Even if he didn't, the dossier usually 
contains rather strong evidence against him, 
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Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
Clare: 
Grbzyk: 
Clare: 
Grbzyk: 
Crane: 
Grbzyk: 
and his denials, if seen as false, would affect his 
sentence, so often he confesses for that reason 
alone. Because he confesses, very little 
additional testimony is needed. Most of our 
trials are really about the sentence, not about 
guilt. 
So it ends up looking somewhat like one of our 
sentencing hearings, which we must have 
whether or not there is a plea bargain. 
Yes, I suppose it does. However, I admit that we 
have been seeking ways to ease the burden on 
our system. As our crime rates rise, the volume 
of cases also rises, and some European 
countries have adopted devices that resemble 
your plea bargaining. But in most countries, 
such things are allowed only for misdemeanors, 
never for major felonies, such as the present 
case. 
If your crime rates are rising, you might have to 
start dealing with organized crime, like we do. 
Plea bargaining really helps us with that. We 
bust the little guys, and give them plea bargains 
to get them to "cooperate" and help us get the 
big guys. Without plea bargains, we'd have 
nothing to offer them. 
I see. So U.S. prosecutors work closely with the 
police? 
Absolutely. Our job is to help the cops fight 
crime. That's what the public expects of us. 
This is much less so in Europe. Our 
prosecutors see themselves as more closely 
allied with the judiciary than with the police. 
Some countries even allow prosecutors to 
become judges. 
That must make your judges pro-prosecution. 
The reverse would be more accurate: our 
prosecutors tend to be "pro-judge," in the sense 
that they are out to secure justice, not to get 
convictions. For example, every prosecutor has 
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a duty to present to the court all evidence that 
favors the defendant, and they readily do so. 
Shocking. 
I'm speaking generally, of course. Individual 
prosecutors vary, and so do circumstances. 
Italy has had a serious problem with organized 
crime, and prosecutors there do work closely 
with the police and aggressively seek to convict 
Mafia leaders. 
If your prosecutors tend to think like judges, 
why not give them the power to plea bargain? 
You said you trust your judges. 
We trust our officials, so long as they do not 
have much discretion. We fear that discretion 
may be abused, as has occurred during periods 
of dictatorship. Perhaps a prosecutor would 
plea bargain because of political pressure from 
friends of the accused. We must protect 
ourselves from such a possibility, so the 
prosecutor is obliged to bring to trial every 
charge supported by the evidence and the law, 
at least in major cases. She has no discretion. 
But you give your judges a lot of discretion. 
No, we really don't. Under your common-law 
system, the law is always changing or 
"evolving," as you might put it. So your judges 
must have discretion to change the law slightly 
to adapt it to new situations, as society 
changes. This is not so in our "civil-law" 
system. Here, the law is fIXed by the legislature, 
and the judge has no discretion to change it. 
Look, we have a lot of statutes too, and our 
judges aren't supposed to change them. But 
they can interpret them, and when they do, they 
have plenty of discretion to plug in whatever 
policies they happen to like. 
I suppose our judges do the same on occasion. 
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statutes are quite vague, and the judge has 
some discretion in deciding what they mean. It 
is somewhat of a paradox. 
Crane: Or maybe a "useful fiction," Professor? 
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Anyway, we can't plea bargain, so it's back to 
the salt mines. 
Scene V: At the cafe 
The two lawyers and their consultants sit at one table, 
drinking cognac. 
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Usually when I fmish a trial, I'm exhausted. 
This time, I didn't even work up a sweat. 
That's because you didn't do anything. Neither 
did I. Just about every time we stood up, Judge 
Big Shot told us to sit down and watch him do 
everything. Who needs lawyers in this crazy 
system? What's there for us to do? 
We help decorate the courtroom. That's why 
they give us these snazzy black robes. We're not 
lawyers, we're fashion statements. 
Ah, you feel that you are not as important as 
you are in the United States. I'm sorry. But 
you still have significant roles here. Defense 
counsel may summon witnesses not called by 
the tribunal, though this rarely occurs. And 
both counsel are expected to present fmal 
arguments to the tribunal, reviewing the 
evidence and the law, and arguing for a certain 
verdict and sentence. Both of you did a fine job, 
by the way, as did the victims' attorney. 
And now we wait for the verdict. I hate this 
part. It drives me batty. 
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What will the verdict look like? Will it be short, 
like "not guilty" or "guilty, life imprisonment"? 
No, the tribunal's judgment will be quite long. It 
will set out the facts of the case, in detail, and 
the law that applies to the case, and explain 
why the tribunal came to its conclusion, both 
about guilt and about the sentence. It will 
discuss the testimony of each witness. 
Who writes it? 
Usually the presiding judge will assign this task 
to one of the other judges. It is never written by 
a lay assessor. 
Most U.S. courts require that the verdict be 
unanimous. Is that so here? 
No. A majority vote is sufficient in some 
countries. We require a two-thirds vote. 
Suppose one of the judges disagrees with the 
judge who writes the decision. Will he write a 
dissenting opinion? 
No. That would be unthinkable. It would tend 
to undermine the court's authority. The public 
must believe that every court decision is 
unanimous. 
Even if it wasn't? 
Even if it wasn't. 
So much for honesty, Professor. What are you 
afraid of? Do you think people won't obey the 
decision or respect your courts if they know 
someone disagreed with it? Are your 
institutions so fragile that they can't stand a 
little dissent? 
I admit, it is troubling. 
a 
It should be. In the United States, some states 
allow less-than-unanimous votes by juries in 
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some cases, and such votes must be announced 
in open court. In our appellate courts, judges 
often write dissents. We've had some very 
important Supreme Court cases decided on five 
to four votes, and people obey them. Dissent 
doesn't necessarily lead to anarchy. 
At the present time, even our highest courts 
never reveal that a judge dissented. I suppose a 
dissent implies either that the majority was 
incompetent, or that reasonable judges have the 
discretion to interpret the law in different ways. 
We do not want either message sent to the 
public. 
Look, this is all very interesting, but I'm having 
trouble concentrating, waiting for the verdict. I 
hate this part too. If I lose, it's all over. 
Not quite, Mr. Crane. You still have your right 
of appeal. 
What's to appeal? The presiding judge seemed 
to know what he was doing. I don't think he 
made any mistakes. With virtually no rules of 
evidence, what mistakes are there to make, 
anyway? An appellate court would throw me 
out: no mistakes, no reversal. 
You might argue that the judgment is not 
. supported by the law or the evidence. 
But then I run up against presumptions, don't 
I? In the United States, the appellate court 
looks at the reporter's transcript of the trial and 
presumes that the jury resolved every credibility 
battle in favor of the judgment, so if the cop said 
one thing and my client said another, I'm out of 
luck. And the appellate court also presumes 
that the jury drew any reasonable inferences 
that support their verdict. 
So even if the jury in fact did not do these 
things, the appellate court nevertheless 
presumes that they did? 
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Exactly. I guess that's all our appellate courts 
can do, because the jury never explains their 
verdict, they just say "guilty." So the appellate 
court never knows how the jury really reasoned 
their way to the verdict. 
But this is not so in our system. The judgment 
must fully explain the tribunal's reasoning, 
including why it believed one witness rather 
than another. So the appellate court sees what 
the tribunal actually thought, not what it might 
have thought. And if the appellate court is not 
persuaded by such reasoning, it might well 
reverse the judgment. 
You talk about the tribunal's reasoning. There 
are nine people on this tribunal, but the 
judgment is written by just one of them. Is it 
likely that nine people would have exactly the 
same reasoning, especially when three of them 
are professional judges and the others aren't? 
Probably not. Another "useful fiction," perhaps. 
Do the appellate judges read the transcripts of 
the trial to see if they support the judgment? 
I'm afraid there are no transcripts, Mr. Crane. 
We have no court reporters at our trials. 
But how do the appellate judges know if the 
judgment correctly summarizes the testimony? 
If I'm arguing a case on appeal, how can I show 
that the facts stated in the judgment are 
inaccurate? 
Our trial judges receive many hours of training 
in writing judgments, and I suppose we trust 
them to summarize the testimony honestly. 
Amazing. Well, I hope this tribunal acquits my 
client, so I don't have to deal with one of your 
appeals. 
Sorry, Mr. Crane, but an acquittal is no 
guarantee that you won't face an appeal. In our 
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system, the prosecutor may appeal too. This is 
important to us, as it helps to ensure that the 
trial court follows the law. We strive for 
consistency in all of our courts. And if the 
appellate court reverses, your client may be 
tried again. 
Really? In the United States, I think one or two 
states allow prosecutors to appeal, but only to 
get an advisory opinion on some important 
issue. And if the prosecutor wins, it doesn't 
affect the defendant. He can't be retried. That 
would violate his right against double jeopardy. 
Here he may be retried. We do have concepts 
similar to your double jeopardy, but they have 
no application to an ongoing case. So the 
prosecution may appeal, and if the appellate 
court reverses, the defendant may be retried. 
The way we see it, once a jury acquits him, 
that's it. A jury's verdict is sacred. 
Sacred when it acquits, but not when it 
convicts? Why should you allow the defendant 
to appeal, but not the prosecution? How does 
that make sense? 
We don't allow a conviction to stand if it doesn't 
square with the law. But if the jury acquits 
because the jury doesn't agree with the law, the 
verdict stands. The jury "nullifies" the law, just 
for that case. It doesn't happen often, but we 
view it as an outlet for public disagreement with 
a law that's not too popular, like laws against 
smoking a small amount of marijuana, for 
example. 
For us, the very notion of allowing a tribunal to 
nullify a law is inconceivable. We would never 
allow it, not even in a single case. As I said 
earlier, we do not tolerate discretion lightly, and 
this seems to be discretion run wild. It could 
never happen here, because judges sit with our 
lay assessors. Even if it did happen, the 
tribunal's written decision would reveal what 
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they had done, and it would never stand up on 
appeal. 
There's another reason why we allow a retrial 
after a conviction, but not after an acquittal. 
The prosecution can afford another trial, but the 
defendant can't. Even if he has the money for 
another trial, or the state is paying his lawyer, it 
is just too difficult emotionally. And if the 
prosecutor could retry him once, why not two or 
three times? Eventually, they would wear him 
down to the point that he would probably rather 
take a plea bargain. So once there is an 
acquittal, that has to be the end of it. 
Let's not forget the sentence. I believe your 
double jeopardy doctrine does not prevent 
prosecutors from appealing improper sentences. 
The same is true here. And the defense 
attorney, of course, may also appeal an 
improper sentence. 
Thanks a lot. 
And even if you don't appeal, the prosecutor 
may appeal on the defendant's behalf. 
Why would I do a thing like that? 
Because it is your duty to do justice, Madame. 
Justice? She's never heard of it. 
This place is really weird. 
That's what I said. 
Do prosecutors really do that? 
Not often. If the trial court might have erred 
against the defendant, usually the defendant 
will appeal. 
Of course, the defendant who appeals risks the 
imposition of further costs if he loses. 
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Yes, of course, but not only that. Every losing 
defendant is assessed certain court costs, not 
including the prosecutor's costs. And if the 
victim intervened, the losing defendant must 
also pay the victim's attorney's fees. 
That's a lot more than most of our states 
require. I guess your system can discourage a 
defendant from dragging out the trial, or from 
appealing. 
I suppose so, but that is not its purpose. We 
simply feel that it is just to compel a guilty 
person to make the state and the victim whole. 
Does it work the other way? If he is acquitted, 
does the state make him whole by paying his 
attorney's fees? 
Yes, as a matter of fact it does. 
We don't do that in the United States. 
Perhaps that is because you sometimes acquit 
people not because they are innocent, but for 
extraneous reasons. You release the guilty 
where illegally seized evidence is excluded, and 
without such evidence you cannot obtain a 
conviction. This is not likely to happen in our 
system. If we acquit a man, he is probably truly 
innocent, so he should suffer no loss at all. 
In the United States, none of this stuff would 
matter much, as the overwhelming majority of 
criminal defendants are indigent. They couldn't 
even pay for my lunch. In those cases, the state 
has to pay for their lawyers, usually public 
defenders. 
We do the same, at least in cases of serious 
crime. And indigent defendants cannot be 
required to pay any costs. In such cases, the 
issue of making the state and the intervenor 
whole is really moot. 
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Your client, of course, is not indigent, Mr. 
Crane. In fact, some have accused him of 
spending so much money on his defense that he 
is trying to "buy an acquittal." 
Look, in the usual case, the prosecution uses or 
has access to many more resources than the 
defense. They have several lawyers available in 
the D.A.'s office, and they have their own 
investigators, plus the whole police department, 
a crime lab, and other agencies like the F.B.I. to 
tum to for help. And all this against a single 
defense lawyer with little investigative help. Do 
people accuse the prosecutors of trying to "buy 
convictions?" Of course not. In Mr. Sampson's 
case, the resources are almost equal for a 
change, so we have about as good a chance as 
the prosecutors to show the jury the whole 
story. That's not unfair. What's unfair is what 
happens in the other ninety-nine percent of the 
cases. 
I hadn't thought of it that way. 
In some cases, a U.S. defendant doesn't even 
have a lawyer. Our Supreme Court has held 
that a defendant has a constitutional right to 
represent himself, without a lawyer, if he's 
stupid enough to go that route. It's his case, so 
he can handle it as he likes. Do you allow this? 
No. Every defendant must have counsel. 
Why? It's the defendant's neck, isn't it? 
Madame forgets. In our countries, the 
proceedings are held not for the benefit of the 
parties, but for the state. It is the duty of the 
tribunal to fmd the truth, and defense counsel 
is better qualified than the defendant to aid this 
effort. 
Remarkable. Everything we talk about seems to 
keep coming back to the same fundamental 
concepts. Where do they come from? Why does 
the United States start with the notion that the 
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parties run the trial, and Europeans start with 
the notion that the state runs it? 
An excellent question. Perhaps the United 
States has a very different attitude towards 
government and authority than we do. 
I agree. To put it bluntly, Europeans trust 
authority, and Americans don't. Speaking 
generally, of course. 
That's true about us. The easiest way to get 
elected to government office in the United States 
is to attack government, especially the central 
governments in Washington and the state 
capitals. 
But it goes well beyond campaign slogans. In 
the United States, you display your mistrust of 
authority by dividing it up. Europeans are not 
so afraid of concentrating it. Our judges have a 
great deal of power. They investigate the case 
before trial, examine all the witnesses during 
trial, and then deliberate right along with the 
lay assessors. Everyone else, the lawyers, the 
lay assessors, takes a back seat to the judges. 
This concentrates most of the power in one 
institution: the judges. 
I don't think U.S. citizens would tolerate that. 
Quite so. Your judges may be respected, but in 
a trial of a major crime, they have very little 
power compared to European judges. But your 
fear of the concentration of power goes even 
further. In your system, no one individual has 
much power because you divide it into so many 
pieces. The prosecutor, not a judge, investigates 
the case. The lawyers, not the judge, present 
the evidence at trial. The judge sits primarily as 
an umpire, making sure that the lawyers obey 
the rules. And your jury, not the judge, decides 
who wins. But then the judge may set aside a 
verdict of conviction if he feels it is not 
supported by the evidence, and the judge, not 
the jury, sentences the defendant. But often 
your legislature has severely limited the judge's 
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discretion in sentencing, so he has little to do 
except apply the legislature's predetermined 
formula. Then an appellate court decides if the 
whole thing was done properly. And your press 
keeps watch to tell the world if any of these actors 
has behaved improperly. Everyone-lawyers, 
jurors, judges, the legislature, reporters-has a 
little piece of the power. No one has it all, or even 
a major part of it. 
You make us sound like a bunch of paranoids. 
That's for you to decide. I'm merely stating the 
facts. 
Perhaps this is why the U.S. system seems so 
complicated. Because we don't trust judges, we 
use a bunch of untrained amateurs: the jurors. 
But because we don't totally trust a bunch of 
amateurs we've never seen before, we have to 
take a lot of time questioning them and 
selecting them. Then we need complex rules of 
evidence to keep them from hearing stuff we 
don't think they can evaluate properly. Because 
we don't want too much power in judges, we 
have the lawyers investigate the case and 
examine and cross-examine the witnesses, 
which takes more time. And because our jurors 
don't know the law, the judge must spend time 
instructing the jury on the law. You don't have 
any of these things under your inquisitorial 
system. 
Our adversarial system doesn't seem very 
efficient. 
No, it doesn't. Our trials usually take a fraction 
of the time yours take. One study showed that 
the average European trial for a serious crime 
takes about one day. 
Maybe so, Professor, but a monarchy is more 
efficient than a democracy. Kings can make 
decisions a lot quicker and cheaper than a 
bunch of quarrelsome legislators. 
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Touche, Mr. Crane. I catch your drift. Maybe 
our authoritarian mentality is showing. A 
vestige of the past, perhaps. 
And maybe ours is a case of democracy run 
amok. 
Wait a minute. Don't forget plea bargaining. 
Your trials might take less time than ours, but 
in your system every case goes to trial. Our 
trials are longer, but over 80% of our cases don't 
even go to trial. Plea bargained cases are 
handled at least as efficiently as your trials, 
maybe more so. 
It seems ironic. You have this elaborate 
structure for your trials, no doubt for good 
reasons, but then you totally dispense with this 
structure in the great majority of your cases. 
Apparently, whatever reasons you have for your 
complex trial system are not good enough to 
persuade you to keep it for most of your cases. 
Is this not weird? 
Our "elaborate structure," as you call it, is 
mainly for the benefit of the defendant. If he's 
,willing to waive it, that's his right. Nothing 
ironic about that. We respect the right of the 
individual to decide what's best for him. 
And we view the features of our system as being 
there for the state, not the parties. 
I suspect that the jury is the fulcrum of your 
system. Suppose you just eliminated the jury, 
and all of your criminal cases were to be decided 
by judges. How would your citizens react? 
I'm not sure. The jury might be on the way out. 
In civil cases, especially business disputes, more 
and more cases are being handled by 
arbitrators. Most criminal cases are still tried 
by juries, but there have been changes that tend 
to make the jury somewhat less attractive, at 
least to defense attorneys. Traditionally, juries 
have been made up of twelve people, and their 
verdicts have had to be unanimous. But now 
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some states allow juries of as few as six people, 
and some allow less than unanimous verdicts, 
like ten to two. 
Sure. It's cheaper with fewer people. And 
nonunanimous verdicts make a hung jury less 
likely, so we have to re-try cases less often. 
That saves money, as well as the burden on 
citizens called for jury duty. . 
It also means you get more convictions, and 
that makes me a bit less eager to have a jury 
trial. What kind of a jury do I get? I used to be 
able to voir dire jurors pretty extensively, to fmd 
out what these strangers were really like. Now, 
in a lot of jurisdictions, the judge does most or 
all of the voir dire. 
That saves a lot of time. 
It sure does. The judge asks them "Can you be 
fair?" Then he gets the expected answer, and 
swears 'em in! When I did voir dire, I would try 
to draw out a juror's true feelings about whether 
they would automatically believe a cop's 
testimony, how they feel about the crime 
charged, and whether they could put aside their 
personal feelings and follow the judge's 
instruction on reasonable doubt. 
But you still have your peremptory challenges. 
Yes, but how can I exercise them intelligently if I 
don't know how the juror feels about these 
things? Sometimes I just have to go by what 
the juror looks like. 
Watch out with that one. You're treading on 
dangerous ground. 
Right. The courts have held that an attorney, 
criminal or civil, prosecution or defense, may 
not exercise a peremptory because of a juror's 
race or sex. So I can't go by what they look like, 
and I can't get into their heads. I'm flying blind. 
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Clare: Come on. Don't you hire high-priced jury 
consultants? 
Crane: I have to, because I can't do much else. 
Consultants give me ideas about body language, 
jurors' occupations, and other things that 
indicate what these people are like. That's 
about all that's left for me to go on. But it's a 
rare case where I have a client that can afford a 
jury consultant. In most criminal cases, 
particularly where the defendant is indigent, the 
defense attorney has to pick jurors by the seat 
of his pants. 
Clare: It's no better for prosecutors. I live by the same 
rules you do. I need my voir dire and 
peremptories to get rid of flakes who might 
cause a hung jury. It's very expensive to re-try 
cases. It's well worth spending a little extra 
time and money up front to get a jury of 
sensible people, so we can try the case just once 
and get it over with. 
Crane: It's sad to see this weakening of the American 
jury. People used to view the jury as 
fundamental to our notion of individualism. A 
jury protects the accused from the government, 
and the judge is seen as part of the government. 
Clare: The prosecution needs protection too. In a lot of 
cases, I'd rather make my pitch to twelve 
ordinary citizens than to one judge, who might 
be some liberal appointed by a liberal governor. 
Crane: Come on. You know very well that most of them 
are ex-D.A.'s appointed by a conservative 
governor. 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
Schmrz: 
Are you kidding? Let me tell you about a case I 
had in front of Judge .... 
An interesting dispute. It would not arise here. 
Why not? 
As you indicate, your judges are usually 
appointed by elected officials, and elected 
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officials often have deftnite philosophies about 
crime, punishment, and the like. They will tend 
to select people with a similar philosophy. And 
those people will have displayed their outlooks 
by their prior work. Most of them were former 
prosecutors, defense attorneys, personal injury 
lawyers, corporate lawyers. Whatever. Your 
governor has a pretty good idea how each of 
these specialists views the world, and he 
appoints accordingly. 
And some of our judges are elected, usually 
after campaign battles over law and order. 
Yes. These matters are relevant to the tasks 
your judges perform, which often involve much 
discretion in fact-fmding, sentencing, and 
establishing the law. In our system, we try to 
minimize the judge's discretion, so her values 
are not important. 
How do you pick your judges? 
In a way, we don't. They pick themselves. Let 
me explain. We do not have law schools as 
such, the separate post-graduate institutions 
that you have. Our law students are 
undergraduate university students, who study 
with the law faculty. At the end of their studies, 
they make a choice: to become lawyers or to 
become judges. If they wish to become lawyers, 
they must apprentice with a law office for a year 
or two, and then take a state examination. If 
they choose the judiciary path, they must pass 
a special state examination upon graduation. It 
is quite competitive, and very few are accepted. 
The candidate's political beliefs are wholly 
irrelevant to whether he or she is accepted. 
Aren't they kind of young to be judges? 
Of course. But before they are allowed to 
handle cases, they must serve apprenticeships 
with experienced judges. Then they are 
assigned small civil and criminal cases. As they 
gain more experience and demonstrate their 
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competence, they may be promoted to higher 
courts and be assigned more significant cases. 
Note that all three of the judges in our case are 
quite mature. 
So politics has nothing to do with it? 
Nothing at all-we hope. Our judges are civil 
servants, not politicians. Each has political 
beliefs, of course, like any citizen does, and 
different judges might have different attitudes 
towards crime, sentencing, and the like. But a 
judge's political beliefs should have as little to 
do with her job as the court clerk's political 
beliefs affect his job. 
Politics isn't necessarily a bad thing, you know. 
If a governor is elected on a tough-on-crime 
platform, he appoints tough-on-crime judges 
because that's what the people want. 
If our people choose to get tough on crime, they 
may elect legislators to enact statutes that do 
this. It is not the judge's place to make such 
choices. 
So let's get to the bottom line, Professor. Which 
system is better? 
Better? Your question is very revealing, Mr. 
Crane. It displays a common assumption that a 
legal system may be appraised apart from the 
society it serves. But it can't. It cannot be 
constructed by experts and imposed from above. 
A nation's legal system emerges from the 
attitudes of its people. Asking which country's 
legal system is better is like asking which 
country's people are better. 
So our system is complex and messy because 
we are complex and messy? 
No. Our system breaks up power because 
Americans don't want power concentrated. 
And our system concentrates power because 
this is more efficient, and because it does not 
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particularly bother our people. We have had 
kings, queens, and other strong leaders for 
centuries, so perhaps our people have gotten 
used to it, even though they now claim to favor 
democracy. Also, as discussed earlier, we 
operate under the principle, or perhaps the 
illusion, that our judges have little discretion, 
that they merely apply the law mechanically. 
Times change, Professor. 
Indeed they do, Mr. Crane. Italy has recently 
changed its legal system. It is moving away 
from the inquisitorial system and toward your 
adversarial system. The Italians have retained 
their mixed panel, but they have taken away the 
power of judges to present the evidence, giving it 
to the lawyers. 
Really? That's greatl Why did they do it? 
They say that they now realize that the 
adversarial system gives greater respect to the 
rights of the individual. 
That's true. The parties have the most at stake, 
so their lawyers should control the presentation 
of the case. 
Of all Europeans, I think the Italians are most 
similar to the United States in your dislike of 
concentrations of power. They would rather 
spread it out. 
These are the justifications given by the Italians, 
officially. But others suspect that something 
else is at work. For years, one of the most 
popular television programs in Italy has been 
your "Perry Mason," where a handsome trial 
lawyer always manages to win at the last 
moment. You know how Italians love a 
dramatic spectacle, like opera. 
So we put on a better show than you do? 
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That we must concede. U.S. trials have much 
better Nielsen ratings than European trials. 
The adversarial system demands a lot more 
from lawyers than the inquisitorial system does. 
Are Italian lawyers up to it? 
That remains to be seen. It will be difficult. 
Many Italian lawyers prepare for trial simply by 
reviewing their code books. They have no 
training in cross-examination, preparation of 
experts, and the like. 
Those are the bread and butter tasks of U.S. 
lawyers. We take courses in those skills, read 
books on them, and practice them every day in 
court, for years. You can't learn them in a day. 
The transition will not be easy. 
I've never heard of a country grafting an 
important feature of one system onto another 
type of system, like the Italians are doing. Is it 
really possible? 
A good question. I'm not sure that the Italians 
have thought that question through carefully 
enough. If and when their lawyers learn the 
U.S. style of trial advocacy, perhaps other 
aspects of their system will also have to change, 
or else they might have to give up the notion of 
letting lawyers control the evidence. I'm not 
sure that one can just plonk a major foreign 
feature into an existing system without radically 
altering the entire system. 
Professor, you didn't like my question about 
which system is better. So let me rephrase it. 
Which system does a better job of finding the 
truth? 
You insist on pinning me down, eh? Well, let 
me begin by passing along a little saying I once 
heard: "An innocent defendant should prefer to 
be tried in Europe, while a guilty defendant 
should prefer to be tried in the United States." 
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Wonderful! A supreme compliment to the skills 
of U.S. defense lawyers-like me, naturally. 
(shaking her head) Look at him. He's proud of 
it! 
Just kidding, Counsel. Prosecutors have no 
sense of humor. 
The saying implies, of course, that the 
inquisitorial system does a better job of fmding 
the truth. 
Who said the saying, a European? 
This I must admit. 
Let's examine the issue a little more closely. I 
suppose the key difference we should focus on is 
who decides what is the truth. You use lay 
jurors and we use professional judges, 
sometimes along with lay people. But as you 
pointed out, Mr. Crane, lay people tend to go 
along with judges. Isn't it rather obvious that 
professionals are better at their jobs than 
amateurs? Professionals have been selected for 
their aptitude, then they are trained, and then 
they spend much more time at their jobs than 
amateurs ever could. A research biologist 
stands a much better chance of flnding the true 
cause of cancer than does some barber or 
baseball player. By the same token, judges are 
bound to be better at fmding the truth at trial 
than jurors could ever hope to be. 
Wait a minute. Judges are trained to know and 
apply the law. They don't take courses in law 
school on how to flgure out who's telling the 
truth. And another thing: criminal trials aren't 
about fmding the cure for cancer. 
Sometimes they seem like it. In the trial we just 
observed, several scientists testifled about the 
accuracy of DNA evidence. It was very 
technical, and I must admit that I had some 
difflculty following it at times. Who was better 
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have had university training and several years 
of listening to expert witnesses, or jurors, who 
might not have graduated from high school, and 
who might be seeing the inside of a courtroom 
for the fIrst time? 
But this case isn't typical. Most criminal trials 
don't involve heavy scientific disputes. Most 
turn on a rather simple question: who's telling 
the truth and who's lying? A robbery victim 
points to the defendant and says, "That's the 
guy who robbed me," and the defendant testifIes 
"I was home watching TV when the robbery 
occurred." A diploma in biology isn't going to 
help you fIgure out which one is right. And 
there's no reason a judge should be any better 
at it than a barber or a ballplayer. 
I'm not so sure about that. Judges hear 
defendants make up stories day in and day out. 
Mter a while, they get a pretty good ear for it. 
But some jurors are so naive they'll buy any 
cock-and-bull story. 
And some judges always believe the cops-or 
say they do, anyway. They have to work with 
the police every day, and they want to stay on 
good terms with them, especially if the judge is 
looking for an appointment to the next court up. 
Judges get more points for being pro-cop than 
being pro-defendant. And as for defendants 
making up stories, sure, some do. The judge 
hears a few of these and then decides that all 
defendants are probably lying. They get jaded. 
That's why we need jurors. They're not 
prejudiced, and they bring a fresh look to 
things. 
You mean they're more likely to fall for your 
tricks. A lot of defense lawyers make a career 
out of confusing jurors. 
Be nice to me, Ms. D.A. Without me, there's no 
you. An adversarial system with only one 
adversary is like the Dodgers showing up for the 
World Series with no opponent. There's not 
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much point to it. Under this inquisitorial 
system, we're both out of work. 
Not quite, but your roles would be substantially 
diminished. 
That's true. I'd probably get more convictions 
here, not having to deal with juries and 
exclusionary rules and the like. But I wouldn't 
have much to do with getting them. It wouldn't 
feellike winning. Not as much fun. 
Hal The truth comes out. You like battling me. 
See, we're both products of the adversarial 
system. Maybe U.S. prosecutors have more in 
common with U.S. defense lawyers than they do 
with European prosecutors. 
Perish the thought. Anyway, Professor, I see 
another problem with your view. Lots of times 
the "truth" we are looking for isn't just a 
"whodunnit." It involves values. The law says 
that murder should be reduced down to 
voluntary manslaughter if the defendant killed 
because of some "reasonable provocation." So if 
the defendant kills because the victim recently 
molested the defendant's kid, we don't punish 
him as much as we would a Mafia hit man. But 
what a "reasonable" provocation is can be a 
tough question. Is it reasonable when someone 
says something racist to you? Is it reasonable if 
someone raped you last week? This isn't a 
question of "truth," it's a question of values. 
Twelve jurors might bring the values of the 
community into the decision better than one or 
even three judges could. 
But such "values" are never considered by our 
tribunals. These questions are decided by our 
legislatures, not our courts. We expect courts to 
apply the law, not to make it. 
Our judges make law all the time. And I guess 
our juries also do it occasionally. 
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whodunnit case. I once had a Latino client who 
wouldn't look the judge in the eye when 
testifying because he came from a countIy 
where that was seen as a threat or an assertion 
of dominance. And you just don't do that with 
someone like a judge. The judge thought he was 
lying. But some of the jurors were Latino and 
knew about that, so they believed him, and they 
acquitted him. 
Clare: I've had cases like that. Often twelve jurors 
have had experience with life that no one judge 
could have. 
Crane: You know, some judges never get out of the 
courtroom. And when they do, they just hang 
out in country clubs with their buddies, other 
judges, a few doctors, and lawyers. They don't 
know much about real life on the streets, where 
most criminal defendants come from. 
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I suppose the same might be said of some of our 
judges. 
It's more of a problem in the United States than 
here in Europe. We have a very diverse 
population, with racial and ethnic groups from 
all parts of the world. In Los Angeles, we 
probably have over fifty different language 
groups, just in one city. And these people have 
different cultures and customs. No single judge, 
no matter how much he gets out in the world, 
can possibly know as much about these 
cultures as twelve jurors. 
Perhaps our mixed tribunal obviates some of 
these difficulties. Our lay assessors may bring 
some real life into the tribunal's deliberations. 
Sort of a compromise, isn't it? You have the 
benefit of professional judges running things, 
but you also get input from the public, through 
the lay assessors. Sounds like a good idea. 
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Quite so. It satisfies both needs. Wouldn't such 
a compromise be an improvement over your jury 
system? 
Maybe, but as we saw in court today, it would 
probably bring a lot of other changes along with 
it. No more hearsay rules, no jury instructions, 
no voir dire, and no peremptory challenges. And 
judges telling jurors how to vote. That's a lot of 
baggage to bring in just to get a mixed tribunal. 
Baggage, or benefits? Many people see those 
things you mentioned as technicalities, well 
worth getting rid of. 
Let's not overstate the amount of power our 
jurors have. Granted, they deliberate alone, 
without a judge with them, unlike the way you 
do it. But we limit them in a way you don't. 
Take that evidence of prior crimes which I tried 
to keep out. Your lay assessors would hear this 
evidence, and then in the deliberation room the 
judge might try to talk them out of misusing it. 
In our system, the judge would screen this 
evidence, and keep the jury from even hearing it 
at all if he felt it was only marginally relevant 
and too prejudicial. 
Yes. I am quite struck by the amount of time 
you spend in the United States on objections 
and pre-trial motions involving whether jurors 
will be allowed to hear certain evidence. It 
seems to reflect a certain lack of confidence in 
their ability to find the truth. 
You know, this problem of fmding the truth is 
not confmed to criminal cases. We deal with it 
all the time in everyday life. An employer 
discovers money missing from the petty cash 
box. Does she just listen to the employee's 
explanations, or does she try to fmd out the 
truth herse1f7 
Obviously, the latter. Are you suggesting that 
the inquisitorial system is more "natural" than 
the adversarial system? 
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Perhaps. 
It's more "natural" only if you see the state in a 
paternalistic role. Maybe you Europeans see 
the state as Big Daddy, but most in the United 
States don't. 
Consider an institution many regard as quite 
paternalistic, the Catholic Church. The Church 
has had experience with both models when 
judging whether certain people were worthy of 
sainthood. The Church initially used the 
inquisitorial model, but this became too loose, 
sanctifying many candidates whose 
qualifications were questionable. So they 
changed to an adversarial system, establishing 
the office of Promoter of the Faith to argue 
against any proponents of a particular 
candidate. 
The proponents called the Promoter the "devil's 
advocate," didn't they? 
Yes. Each side had its lawyers, and the case 
was tried before the Pope's representatives. It 
worked quite well for several centuries. But the 
whole process became so lengthy and 
cumbersome that it was recently abandoned. 
The process is now more inquisitorial. 
What about scientists? Do they seek the truth 
through an adversarial model, an inquisitorial 
model, or neither? 
Probably through a blend of each. An individual 
scientist may act as an unbiased inquisitor, 
initially, but once he publicly proposes a new 
thesis, the process might well become somewhat 
adversarial, where he defends his thesis, other 
scientists attack it, and the remaining scientific 
community sits as the tribunal. It is a tribunal 
of professionals, of course, not lay people. 
I think we're overlooking something here. 
Finding the truth, whatever that is, is 
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important. But it's not the only thing. We have 
juries for other reasons as well. 
Such as? 
Well, we talked earlier about how Americans 
don't really trust government that much. 
Criminal cases are about basic moral decisions, 
what the morals of a community are all about. 
Our communities want to be involved in making 
those decisions. They don't want to leave it all 
to the judges. 
Don't they elect the legislators who enact the 
criminal laws? 
Yes, but that's not enough. The laws are 
abstract. A real case is concrete. It hits home. 
I'm just trying to imagine what it would be like 
with no juries. People would probably think 
that all these judgments, both convictions and 
acquittals, were coming down from on high, 
from the top. I can just see the accusations of 
racism, sexism, classism, elitism, and other 
"isms" flooding the newspapers. When people 
see a case decided by fellow citizens, they are 
more likely to accept it. 
Not always. Look at the riots resulting from the 
Rodney King case, when a California jUlY 
acquitted the white cops who beat up a black 
man. 
True, but that was an aberration, an all-white 
suburban jury trying a case that should have 
been tried by a racially-mixed jury in Los 
Angeles. That proves my point. If a mixed Los 
Angeles jury had acquitted those cops, I don't 
think the riots would have happened. 
Are you saying that even if your jury is more 
likely to be mistaken than our judges, the jury 
is still better because it makes the judicial 
system and its rulings more acceptable to your 
people? 
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being right all the time. 
Crane: And maybe we are saying only that it works 
better for us. In Europe, your local populations 
are not as diverse as ours. Perhaps it is less 
important to have a cross-section of the people 
deciding criminal cases. Maybe your judges are 
not all that different from the rest of the 
community, just a little better educated. So 
your people are more willing to accept 
judgments from judges. 
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Europe is changing. We now have more mobile 
populations, with more intermixing. So perhaps 
our needs will become similar to yours. Our 
crime rates are rising, and illegal drugs are 
becoming more of a problem, as they have been 
in your country for some time. Italy is 
changing, and it is also changing its legal 
system. Maybe other countries will follow suit. 
I'm beginning to see why my question about 
which system is better didn't make a lot of 
sense. Maybe there is no "better." It all 
depends on what a particular society wants and 
thinks it needs. 
We see another problem with juries. It is very 
important to us that the law be certain, 
consistent, and predictable, and that our 
officials be seen as having very little discretion. 
As an institution, the jury runs counter to these 
objectives. Because they are untrained novices, 
jurors are quite unpredictable and they appear 
to have wide discretion. Allowing them to 
return general verdicts, without explaining their 
reasons, tends to confirm this. 
I'm not sure that using judges is much better. 
True, an individual judge might be pretty 
predictable. An experienced local lawyer can 
usually tell you how Judge X will rule, if she's 
been on the bench for a while. But the lawyer 
will also predict that Judge Y will rule just the 
opposite. This seems to make "the law" not very 
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predictable. It all depends on which judge the 
case is assigned to. 
That is not so much of a problem for us. As I 
explained earlier, our judges are not selected for 
their political philosophies. In addition, they 
are all trained in the same way, they are 
required to explain their decisions, and allowing 
both sides to appeal tends to ensure that they 
will follow the law. These features make judges 
consistent with each other and with their own 
prior rulings. 
The role of juries in U.S. law is important, but 
let's not overstate it. Except in death penalty 
cases, the jury usually has no say about what 
sentence the defendant receives. That's for the 
judge, and most of our jurisdictions do allow 
both the prosecution and the defense to appeal 
sentencing decisions. This helps to make the 
sentencing more consistent and predictable. 
I'm trying to imagine what it would be like if our 
juries did the sentencing. It could get pretty 
wild. Each jury is made up of twelve different 
people, most of whom have never decided a case 
before. If the law gave them a lot of leeway in 
sentencing, say one to ten years for armed 
robbery, some juries would give one and some 
would give ten. 
The same thing can happen with judges, as a 
group. One judge might give one year, and 
another ten. But at least a given judge will tend 
to be pretty consistent. 
Right. If the case has been assigned to a 
particular judge, the sentence becomes 
somewhat predictable. That's very important for 
plea bargaining. When I try to convince a client 
to accept a deal, he wants to know what will 
happen if he rejects the bargain and goes to 
trial. If I can't give him a pretty good idea of 
this, he's likely to take his chances and go to 
trial. 
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probably have fewer plea bargains and more 
trials, which would require more resources. 
Crane: This all assumes, of course, that the legislature 
allows leeway in sentencing. These days, a lot 
of them don't. 
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Does it also assume that you will continue to 
bifurcate your trials, trying guilt and sentencing 
separately? 
Yes. Even if we gave sentencing to the jury, we 
couldn't give it to them at the same time as the 
guilt issue. First, it would mean that evidence 
relating to sentencing would come in, maybe 
evidence of the defendant's prior criminal 
lifestyle, and you just can't trust a jury to decide 
guilt fairly when they've heard that stuff. 
Second, it's just too confusing for a bunch of lay 
people to decide more than one issue at a time. 
It would take them forever to come back with a 
verdict. And if we required a unanimous 
verdict, they'd probably never come back. 
Your system of combining the two issues in one 
trial is probably more efficient than ours. 
Yes, but it works only because we have 
professional judges deliberating with the lay 
assessors. I agree with Mr. Crane. It would 
never work if we used only the lay assessors. 
So maybe our jury system is really a 
compromise. We use juries, for all the reasons 
we discussed, but we limit their input to only 
half the case: the question of guilt. They play 
no part in the sentencing half, which is just as 
important. 
With one exception. 
Yes, capital cases. There the penalty is so 
extraordinary that we don't want the state to 
impose it without the consent of the community, 
at least twelve of its members. 
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Your comments on the truth intrigue me. 
Under your adversarial system, do lawyers want 
the tribunal to learn the truth? 
I do. The truth is, the defendant is guilty. 
There's an unbiased opinion for you. 
Actually, it is. I spend a lot of time before trial 
talking to witnesses and examining the physical 
evidence. And I get to see a lot of evidence the 
jury probably won't see, such as illegally seized 
evidence and his prior record. These things 
might persuade me that he's guilty even if the 
jury later acquits him. But if what I see 
convinces ~e that he's innocent, I don't take the 
case to trial. I dismiss it. I don't want to 
convict an innocent man. So when I take a case 
to trial, I know he's guilty. For me, that is the 
truth. 
Very noble, Counsel. But you don't always 
know someone is innocent or guilty. Suppose 
you aren't sure. Suppose some guy is accused 
of rape, he claims the woman consented, she 
denies it, and you aren't sure who's telling the 
truth. Do you take it to trial? 
That's a tough one. A lot depends on whether I 
think I can get a conviction. I don't like to lose. 
It maKes it harder for me to drive a tough plea 
bargain if people aren't afraid that I'll win if the 
case goes to trial. And losing isn't much of a 
career booster, quite frankly. So if I think he's 
guilty, . but I'm not sure the evidence shows it 
beyond a reasonable doubt, I might dismiss or 
plea bargain instead of trying it. I have enough 
trouble rmding time to prosecute the guys I 
know I can nail. I don't need to waste time with 
weak cases. 
Don't dodge the issue. Suppose you have your 
doubts, but you're getting political pressure to 
prosecute-maybe from some women's group. 
Do you go to trial? 
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their job, not mine. 
Crane: A clever way of covering your rear end. If you 
dismiss or plea bargain, the women's group will 
say you sold them out. But if you go to trial and 
lose, maybe they'll blame the jury and not you. 
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Let me make sure I understand you, Ms. Clare. 
Even if you're not convinced he's guilty, in your 
role as an advocate you argue that he is? You 
try to persuade the jury that she's telling the 
truth and he isn't? 
I guess I do. Once I get into trial, I want to win. 
In our system, no prosecutor would argue that 
the accused is lying if she did not in fact believe 
that he was. 
When I get to trial, defense attorneys seem to 
bring out the worst in me. 
What do you mean? 
When I ftrst look at a case, I'm very objective, 
seeing all sides of it pretty fairly. At that point, I 
might be willing to dismiss or settle. But as I 
get closer to trial, I become more of an advocate, 
and I hone down my arguments and my 
rebuttals to my opponent's arguments. But the 
odd thing is, I usually convince myself with my 
arguments. Sometimes I look back on how I felt 
when I ftrst saw the case, when I was very 
dubious about it, and I can't ftgure out how I 
became so sure that the case should come out 
only one way. It's a strange transformation. 
It's not peculiar to prosecutors. It happens to 
me too. It happens to all U.S. litigators, even in 
civil cases. There's nothing wrong with it. It's 
inherent in the adversary system. How can you 
persuade a jury if they don't feel that you believe 
what you're saying? 
So U.S. lawyers are all actors, pretending to 
believe something they don't? 
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But you can't pretend. The jury will see 
through it. That's why you have to convince 
yourself fIrst. 
A peculiar psychological task, isn't it? 
It is, and a lot of people don't understand it. 
They just think lawyers are liars, saying things 
they don't believe just to win. It's not that 
simple. 
Anyway, I don't feel so bad about it. Defense 
counsel will urge the jury to acquit the 
defendant, even when he knows the defendant 
is guilty. He's certainly not out for the truth. 
I'm not convinced that either of you are out for 
the truth. I happened to read some newspaper 
reports which discussed some evidence that the 
Accused may have become agitated by 
something the victims did soon before the 
killings. This would tend to show that he did 
not premeditate the killing, which would have 
reduced the crime to second degree murder. If 
it showed a reasonable provocation, it might 
even have reduced it to voluntary manslaughter. 
And yet neither of you introduced this evidence. 
Why? 
I took the position that the prosecution couldn't 
prove that he even committed the killings. I 
didn't want to confuse the jury with any 
arguments that assumed that he did commit 
them. 
I charged him with flrst degree murder. So 
naturally I wouldn't want to put in any evidence 
that detracted from that. 
So each of you, for different reasons, deceived 
the tribunal, correct? 
That's putting it pretty strong. I think he 
premeditated, so why should I help him by 
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putting on evidence that tends to show that he 
didn't? 
You think he premeditated, but isn't it the 
tribunal's task to determine whether he did or 
not? And you deprived it of the opportunity to 
do so. This would never happen in our system. 
The prosecutor has a duty to present all 
evidence which is relevant to the case, no 
matter which side it seems to help. The task of 
the tribunal is to fInd the truth, not to decide 
which side has presented the better case. 
I don't think I deceive the court when I don't put 
on evidence I know about. It's not the job of a 
defense attorney to help the court fmd the 
truth. My duty is to my client. I can't tell him 
to lie, and I can't put on false evidence. That 
would be deceiving the court. 
A fme line, to be sure. 
Is it? Is it much different from refusing to plead 
guilty when I know he's guilty? I do that when 
the prosecution has a weak case. I just try to 
poke holes in the prosecutor's case and hold her 
to her burden of proving the case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. If I succeed and get my client 
off, I've done my job well, even if he is actually 
guilty. 
So his guilt has no effect on you? 
I wouldn't say that. Like the prosecutor, I don't 
like to lose. And if I lose at trial, my client's 
sentence will be greater than it would be if I had 
gotten him a decent plea bargain. So if the 
prosecutor has a strong case, I'll probably 
advise my client to bargain. 
Now who's dodging the issue? Suppose I have a 
weak case, but you know your client is guilty. 
You'll still urge the jury to acquit him. You 
know it and I know it. 
Correct. 
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Morally, you have no problem with that, Mr. 
Crane? 
Of course not. Look, I'm no different from any 
other decent citizen. I don't want a rapist 
running loose to threaten my wife or daughter. 
As a citizen, I want this guy put away for a long 
time if he did it. But as his lawyer, I want him 
to walk. 
How can you want two inconsistent results? 
And why put yourself in such a difficult 
position? 
That's the same as asking me why I became a 
lawyer. I did it because I believe in our system, 
the adversary system. I think it works. Without 
me, or someone like me, doing what I do, the 
adversary system just couldn't work properly. 
Many people feel that U.S. criminal defense 
lawyers are ... how should I say it? 
I'll say it for you. We're greedy shysters, 
manipulators, liars, out to. get mass murderers 
off on technicalities, et cetera, et cetera. I've 
heard them all. 
Do those accusations bother you? 
I don't mind heat. I get plenty of it from 
prosecutors and judges, in court. That comes 
with the territory. But it does bother me when 
people don't understand how defense attorneys 
contribute to the rendering of justice. Basically, 
they just don't understand the adversary 
system. 
Justice? Are you seeking justice when you urge 
a jury to free a guilty man? 
See, that's the problem. You think my job is to 
fmd a just result and urge the jury to come back 
with that verdict. It isn't. Under the adversary 
system, it's the system's job to come up with a 
just result. That's not the job of each player in 
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bailiff. His job is to take care of the jury. But 
he hears the evidence and arguments, and he 
might come to his own conclusions. When he 
escorts the jury into the deliberation room, is he 
supposed to tell them what he thinks is the just 
result? No way. That's not his role. Same with 
me. 
So justice emerges from each player carrying 
out his or her limited role? 
Yes, but only if every actor plays his role 
properly. Clare's role is to prosecute, my role is 
to defend, and the jury's rule is to decide who's 
right. If I play her role, or she plays mine, or 
either of us plays the jury's role, it doesn't work. 
We're sort of like an automobile engine. The 
pistons go up and down, the gears go from side 
to side, and some of the rods even go 
backwards. Everything seems to be going in a 
different direction, but when all of them work 
together properly, the whole car goes forward, 
just where you want it to go. 
An attractive analogy, Mr. Crane. But the bailiff 
is not actively trying to free a man who might be 
guilty. You are. How can you expect the U.S. 
public to look kindly on you? 
It's not easy. And we haven't done a very good 
job of explaining to the public how we help 
them. Look at it this way. There are two 
possibilities, my client will either be convicted or 
he'11 be acquitted. Either way, I help society. If 
he's convicted, the fact that I tried hard to get 
him acquitted lets us all sleep better, knowing 
that it's very unlikely we are punishing an 
innocent man, because I made sure the jury 
knew every weakness in the prosecution's case. 
And if my efforts help get him acquitted, we can 
be sure we're not punishing an innocent man. 
But sometimes your efforts have nothing to do 
with guilt or innocence. When you urge the 
court to exclude relevant evidence because the 
police forgot to obtain a search warrant, or to 
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exclude a confession because the police forgot to 
read the defendant his Miranda rights, you seek 
to prevent the jury from fmding the truth about 
guilt or innocence. Aren't these the sorts of 
technicalities the public complains about? 
Look, my job is to make the arguments for my 
client, and that's all. I can't decide anything, 
and I can't make the rules. That's the court's 
job. If the public doesn't like the rules, they 
should blame the courts and the legislatures, 
not me. I'm just the messenger: I tell the court 
when the rules have been broken. 
That seems reasonable. But if people don't like 
the rules, I suppose they'll blame the flrst 
person that mentions them. You. 
Right. The basic problem is that people don't 
appreciate why we have these rules. The 
exclusionary rule protects all of us from 
unreasonable searches and arrests, and the 
Miranda warnings make sure that the police 
don't coerce defendants into confessing. You 
can agree or disagree with these policies, but 
you can't fairly call them "technicalities." 
They're not like rules about what size paper 
your briefs have to be written on; they deal with 
fundamental rights. If they make it a little 
harder to fmd the truth in some cases, it's well 
worth the price. I just wish the public 
understood that. 
The u.s. public sometimes sees the arguments 
that lawyers present as rather fanciful. 
Shouldn't you take responsibility for the 
arguments you make? 
I should, and I do. All good lawyers make 
creative arguments. The public doesn't realize 
that lawyers in an adversarial system have to 
push the envelope, to test the outer edges of the 
rules. That's part of our job. If we didn't, the 
law would never change, and we wouldn't be 
representing our clients to the fullest. And don't 
worry, if we cross the line between creative and 
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fanciful, the judge won't hesitate to shoot us 
down. 
Intellectually, you present a persuasive case, 
Mr. Crane, as one might expect from an 
intelligent lawyer. But let's talk about your 
feelings for a moment. I believe that's 
fashionable in California these days. How do 
you feel when a jury acquits a man you know to 
be guilty? 
That doesn't happen often. But when it does, I 
don't lose any sleep. I just make doubly sure 
my doors are locked. 
So you feel content? 
Content? When I win, I feel terrific! 
The verdict reinforces your belief in the system, 
I suppose. 
The system? When the jury walks through that 
door with a verdict, who's thinking about the 
system? Half the time, I'm not even thinking 
about my clientl I'm thinking about one thing: 
victory. A lawyer in the adversarial system is 
like an athlete or a soldier, at least when we're 
caught up in the emotions of a trial. Who would 
think of asking a pro football player why he 
wants to win the game? We're the same way. 
I'm not sure whether we're born that way or the 
adversarial system makes us that way, but 
that's what happens. 
During trial, I feel the same thing. I might think 
about the rights and wrongs of it all before the 
trial begins, but once the judge bangs that 
gavel, I just want to win. Period. 
Of course, winning is profitable for both of you, 
is it not? Doesn't a good record enhance your 
careers? 
Sure it does. That's how I get clients and she 
gets promotions. But that's not what keeps us 
going during a trial. Then we're warriors, not 
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career climbers. I'll balance my checkbook 
later. 
Remarkable. I suppose this competitive drive is 
what creates the drama we spoke of earlier. 
Yes. We are very competitive, and most of our 
trial lawyers want to be Perry Mason, each in 
their own way. 
I don't think our lawyers have these feelings, at 
least not to the degree you exhibit them. 
They don't know what they're missing. Say 
what you will about the adversarial system, but 
it sure is fun, at least for the lawyers. 
Even when you lose? 
Of course not. But the thrill of winning makes 
you forget your losses, 'til the next one, anyway. 
It is pretty much like competitive sports, I 
suppose. 
We Europeans think competition is more suited 
to the soccer field than our law courts. In the 
United States, you seem to treat the quest for 
justice as just a game. 
It's a game, all right, but it's not just a game. 
The competitive spirit is the gas that makes the 
car go. It's the energy that drives the 
adversarial system-a very good system, I might 
add. It gets to the truth, most of the time, while 
still serving other values we think are 
important. 
Does it? How can you have such faith in a 
system that might result in an acquittal of a 
client you know to be guilty? Doesn't that show 
that your adversarial system is faulty? 
Not necessarily. Maybe it just shows that 
humans aren't perfect. Until we develop an 
infallible lie detector machine, we'll have to rely 
on fallible people to decide whether other people 
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are telling the truth. And they won't always get 
it right. Do your judges always get it right? 
Probably not, but when the defendant 
confesses, our judges are less likely to get it 
wrong. And we do get more confessions than 
you do. 
But look at how you get them. As I said before ... 
Please, Crane. Once is enough. 
Now wait a minute, Clare. I ... 
Pardon me for raising this, but I can't help 
noticing a certain tension between you two. Do 
you dislike each other? 
Not at all. Crane and I get along pretty well, 
considering. 
Considering? 
Considering we're on opposite sides, of course. 
Opposite sides? If Mr. Crane's analogy is 
correct, you are both parts of the same 
automobile engine, each working to move the 
car forward towards the same destination: a just 
result. Your goals are the same, aren't they? 
Why should there be any animosity at all 
between you? 
Good question. I guess when you represent the 
same side over and over, you develop certain 
attitudes about crimes and cops. I have mine, 
he has his. And the two usually conflict. 
And don't forget the emotions we talked about. 
When you get all worked up at trial a few times, 
always on the same side, it tends to worm its 
way inside you, and it stays there. 
True. Also, different personality types are 
attracted to one side or the other. Prosecutors' 
offices tend to draw in people who are straight, 
orderly types. 
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So I'm crooked and disorderly? 
Not necessarily. But you and your ilk do tend to 
be more like rebels. You're not too likely to pick 
prosecutors as your drinking buddies and vice-
versa. 
Conceded. We tend to distrust big government, 
cops, and the establishment generally. You 
don't. You wear pin stripes and wing-tips, and 
we wear flashy ties and pony tails. 
Could either of you switch sides? 
Me? Defend criminals? Never in a million 
years. 
Actually, I used to work as a prosecutor. But I 
couldn't do it now. I can't work for a 
bureaucracy. I'm just not the organization-man 
type. But I'm glad I did it. It taught me a lot 
about how the opposition operates. 
The "opposition"-again. 
loyalty to one side only? 
the adversarial system? 
Is this healthy, this 
And is it necessary to 
I never really thought about it. How could it be 
any different? You can't represent both sides. 
British barristers do. A barrister might be 
retained by the prosecutor's office in one case, 
and then by the accused in the next case. Some 
tend to specialize in representing one side or the 
other, but many take each case as it comes. 
They are vigorous advocates in the particular 
case, put it behind them when it is over, and 
then become just as vigorous in the next case. 
It works, and no one has suggested that it 
diminishes the adversarial nature of British 
practice. 
Maybe the United States should try this. 
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I stand corrected, Mr. Crane. 
Still, it's an intriguing idea, the more I think 
about it. Maybe each of us would have a little 
more respect for the other side if we took one of 
their cases occasionally. We could try it out, in 
some sort of test program. 
There is something else you might try: the 
inquisitorial system. Some American critics of 
your system have proposed this, believing that it 
would be much more efficient. Some have even 
pointed to the present case as an example of 
how expensive and inefficient the adversarial 
system can be. 
That might have had a chance a while ago, but 
not now. 
Why is that? 
Sentencing. In recent years, our sentences have 
gone through the roof. Mandatory minimums, 
consecutives, three-strikes-and-you're-out, truth-
in-sentencing laws. It's getting worse all the time. 
I don't understand. I grant that your sentences 
are much higher than ours, but why would this 
preclude your adoption of the inquisitorial 
system? What is the connection? 
Let's forget about the lawyers for a moment and 
just think about the defendant. If you are 
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charged with a crime in the United States, the 
prosecution is out to clobber you. They want to 
put you in a miserable place for a very long 
time, and sometimes they want to kill you. They 
might have good reasons for this. I appreciate 
people's frustrations about crime. But 
reasonable or not, it's clear that the prosecutors 
are not looking after your interests, so you have 
to do it yourself. It doesn't matter whether 
you're guilty or innocent. You're going to resist; 
it's human nature. And when you do, the 
government is going to fight even harder. So 
the system is inherently adversarial from the 
start-with or without lawyers and judges. All 
the lawyers and judges do is insist on some 
procedures that make the fight a little more 
civilized. 
Makes sense, I guess. But I don't see how this 
explains the differences in systems. Doesn't the 
prosecution always want the defendant 
punished, even in the inquisitorial system? 
It depends on how you are using the word 
"punish." When my child misbehaves, I punish 
him in order to reform his behavior and make 
him a better person, not to hurt him. I punish 
him because I love him. 
Come on, Professor, tell the truth. When your 
kid wrecks the furniture, you punish him 
because you're angry at him, and also to cut 
down the expense of buying new chairs, don't 
you? It's not all just for him. 
I confess, those motives are also present, along 
with the ones I mentioned. I want to help him, 
and I am also annoyed and want to protect my 
household. Is your decision to prosecute based 
on the same mixture of motives? 
I guess not, at least for most major crimes. If 
I'm going after an adult armed robber, I try to 
satisfy my community's anger at people like 
him, and I want him off the streets for as long 
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as possible. Usually, I'm not trying to help him 
at all. 
Will he receive any help in prison? 
Are you kidding? Years ago, we tried to 
rehabilitate prisoners: teach them to read and 
learn a trade, so they might get a job when they 
get out. In fact, rehabilitation was seen as one 
of the main purposes of punishment. But today 
people just want the two things Ms. Clare just 
mentioned: to hurt the guy and to get him out of 
the way. Any help he might get in prison is 
incidental, and most of them get very little. 
I suppose it's true. Today, for most defendants, 
the sentence he receives has little to do with any 
notion of how long it might take to rehabilitate 
him. . 
You say "most." Are there exceptions? 
Sure. If I have a young defendant without much 
of a record, I might give him a break, maybe get 
him into a diversion program to help him break 
a drug habit, or recommend a suspended 
sentence on condition he behaves himself and 
gets a job. If I don't have an angry victim 
pushing me, I might try to help him. 
This is the approach the inquisitorial system 
takes with almost all defendants. Perhaps I 
would not go so far as to say that we hurt them 
because we love them, as Professor Schmrz does 
his child. But we start \vith the assumption 
that they are redeemable. 
Not all of them, of course. Terrorists who kill 
innocent people probably evoke the same 
response in our community that the average 
burglar does in yours. 
Are you telling me that your defendants think 
the state is trying to help them by prosecuting 
them, so they don't have much incentive to 
fight? 
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I wouldn't go quite that far, but I would say this. 
The average robber would not feel that a state 
that fmes him or sentences him to four or six 
months in prison hates him, even if it does not 
love him. On some level, he might believe that 
he did wrong and deserves some loss of freedom 
for a while. But if the state were to imprison 
him for ten years for the same crime, he might 
think that depriving him of a substantial part of 
his life was much more than just desserts. 
It's worse than that. A ten-year sentence is 
society's declaration that he is worthless, that 
he has no chance for redemption, that his 
community does hate him. While a six-month 
sentence might conceivably reform him, there is 
little chance that a ten-year sentence will do so. 
He has effectively been declared an outcast for 
the rest of his life. He'll never see this as for his 
own benefit, and he won't take it without a 
fight. Any system that threatens him with this 
will necessarily be an adversarial system. 
Ms. Clare, you mentioned your occasional 
sympathy for young offenders. Wasn't your 
juvenile court system built on similar premises? 
Yes. It was intended to punish juveniles like 
you punish your child: to protect society and to 
help the kids grow up to be good citizens. There 
was supposed to be an element of love in it, sort 
of. 
Did this approach affect the way juvenile court 
trials were handled? 
Yes. They were set up to be pretty 
nonadversarial. No juries, no defense lawyers, 
and relaxed rules of evidence. The kid didn't 
need those things to protect him, because the 
court was out to help him, not to hurt him. 
That was the idea, but it didn't work out that 
way. Kids were thrown into miserable detention 
homes, which were like jails, and often their 
"sentences" were set according to what they had 
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done, not what they needed. It began to look so 
much like adult court that our Supreme Court 
required states to give them some of the same 
rights that adult defendants get, like defense 
lawyers. It became an adversarial proceeding 
because the state was trying to punish them, 
not help them. If the proceeding is based on 
hostility rather than concern, it will always be 
adversarial. 
So, I see why you said that the nature of the 
sentence may affect the nature of the 
adjudicatory system. 
Yes. Earlier, I compared a U.S. adversarial trial 
to a baseball game. Maybe for the lawyers it is. 
To us, it's mainly a game-a big game, but still a 
game. But the defendant has much more at 
stake. For him, it's more like a bullfight. The 
matador is trying to kill the bull, and the bull is 
fighting for his life. That's the essence of it. 
You can change the weapons, the costumes, or 
the players. You could even give the bull a 
lawyer. But if they're still trying to kill the bull, 
the adversarial nature of the contest won't 
change. The bull will never quietly accept an 
"inquisitorial" decision that he should die. He'll 
always fight back. 
The bull is innocent, of course. 
True, but that doesn't matter much. Even a 
guilty bull, or a guilty defendant, will resist 
when his enemy is trying to take his life or a 
substantial part of it. And he should. Even if 
you're guilty, that doesn't mean you deserve the 
penalty they're trying to inflict on you. 
How would your bull-defendant react to an 
inquisitorial system, if the United States were to 
adopt it? 
I can just imagine me telling him, "Joe, I won't 
bother cross-examining the key witnesses 
against you, because we can depend on the 
judge to try to get to the truth. You should just 
get up there and confess. Don't worry, you can 
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trust the prosecutor and the court to look out 
for your interests." He'd say, "Counselor, are 
you nuts? Those guys are trying to put me 
away for twenty years. That is not in my 
interests, no matter what I did. If you won't 
fight back for me, I'll get a lawyer who will." 
See, the inquisitorial system just doesn't mesh 
with the high sentences. 
Are these harsh sentences wise? I understand 
that your communities are concerned about 
crime, but they might do more to stop crime if 
they directed their efforts more toward 
rehabilitation? 
Rehabilitation is pretty tough to do. When you 
punish your child, you can do a lot to see that 
the punishment helps him, or at least doesn't 
hurt him, because you control most of his life. 
You make sure that he is well-fed and housed, 
that he does his homework, and develops a good 
character and work habits. You have some say 
over the company he keeps. The punishment 
might help him, because the rest of his life is in 
good shape. That's just not true of most 
criminal defendants in the United States. They 
live in rough neighborhoods where they hang 
out with criminals, they go to lousy schools, and 
they often have bad home situations. A 
prosecutor can't do anything about this. 
Neither can the judge, and neither can the 
prison warden. We can't take "the whole 
person" and help him the way you help your 
kid. So we punish to help us, not to help the 
defendant. That's all we can do. 
In our villages, or in neighborhoods of our cities, 
there are often support systems that enable us 
to help wayward offenders, even adults. 
COUldn't your society do something to change 
the conditions you describe? 
Maybe we could, but we don't. Those are 
political questions that are much larger than 
the question of whether we should have an 
adversarial or inquisitorial legal system. Some 
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voters think we should do more for the poor, 
and others think it's hopeless or too expensive 
to try, and they're too angry with criminals to 
care about helping them. Right now, the second 
group seems to be having its way. But whatever 
the people decide, we in the legal profession are 
stuck with their decisions. We're just the tail, 
not the dog. Our criminal legal system is a 
symptom of how those larger political questions 
are handled. At the moment, U.S. prosecutors 
can't help the defendant much. So we try to 
hurt him. And when we do, he fights back. 
Does it follow that you must give him the tools 
to fight with, like defense lawyers and juries? 
It does follow. When you have a lot of cops and 
prosecutors trying to hurt people rather than 
help them, some are bound to make mistakes 
and commit abuses. So the defendant needs 
protections. You can't allow an aggressive 
prosecution without giving the defendant the 
power to defend himself. 
Is there a consensus on that point among your 
citizens? 
In the abstract, I'm not sure. But when just one 
case of serious injustice hits the newspapers, 
like an innocent guy getting railroaded, most 
people do insist that protections be built into 
the system. 
Same thing happens on the other side. If just 
one man gets off or gets out and commits 
another serious crime, the public demands that 
we change the whole way we deal with criminal 
cases. 
Yes. We've been talking as if our system is 
based on a careful weighing of all the things 
we've been talking about. But often we set 
policy by sound bites. Maybe that's why we 
sometimes seem so erratic. Somebody commits 
a crime the public sees as particularly heinous, 
and some politician gets a lot of mileage by 
pushing an increase in the penalty for that 
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crime. Over time, this happens with several 
crimes, and gradually that changes the 
standard. So the sentences for all crimes get 
ratcheted up, even though we never sat down 
and decided that this would be a good idea for a 
coherent system. 
In Europe, where prosecutors are not so 
aggressively seeking long sentences, there is not 
as much need for protections for the defendant, 
which make up the heart of your adversarial 
system. 
Right. Until we change to a sentencing 
approach that shows more Goncem for the 
defendant, I don't think we can change to an 
inquisitorial-type system. 
But that doesn't mean we can't consider 
adapting certain features from the inquisitorial 
system that might improve our adversarial 
system. 
Like what? 
Well, for example, we might .... 
A young man comes up to Grbzyk and whispers in his ear. 
Grbzyk: A fascinating question, but we must defer it to 
another day. Now, we should return to court. 
The tribunal is ready to announce its judgment. 
They all rise and begin walking . 
Schmrz: 
Clare: 
. So, my friends, you have learned much about 
our inquisitorial system? 
Yeah. Thanks for the tips. But the funny thing 
is, something else happened, something I never 
expected. By looking at your system and 
comparing it with ours, I picked up some 
insights into our system. I've been an American 
lawyer for quite a while, and I thought I knew 
our system inside out. I do, in a way, but I've 
been so busy climbing the trees that I never had 
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Crane: 
Clare: 
Grbzyk: 
Schmrz: 
a good look at the forest. I just took juries, 
hearsay rules, and opponents like Crane for 
granted, without seeing how it all fit together. I 
guess a goldfish doesn't know what her bowl 
really looks like until she gets out and sees 
another bowl. 
It's been an eye-opener, all right. I thought 
things like the jury trial, the exclusionary rule, 
and the privilege against self-incrimination were 
engraved in stone, like the Ten Commandments. 
They're not. You can have a just and civilized 
legal system without them. You do, and you 
don't seem to be savages, except for your coffee. 
Americans view those things as fundamental 
rights because .... 
Just because they're American. 
And we do the same. We accept and expect 
certain features just because of who we are. 
But people change. And when they do, maybe 
they can learn from other cultures. 
All exit, into the courthouse. 
-CURTAIN-
